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Abstract

Three Essays on the Economic Impacts of Immigration
Juan T. Sayago-Gómez
The movement of population is a part of the adjustment process in economics and society to changes in conditions and the environment. However migration can affect the
host country and have negative consequences, such as poverty, crime, and overcrowding
the social systems that provide access to health care and public goods. This dissertation addresses some cases of what are the consequences of migration: First it considers
the opening of the European Union to new countries in 2004 and 2007 insignificant
effects from the increase of all immigrants, African immigrants, and Latin American
immigrants on crime rates of the regions, but there is a positive correlation from the
immigration of Europeans on property crime. Then it addresses the choice of undocumented immigrants to locate in the United States. The results from this analysis shows
the importance of economic variables and highlight an interesting condition related to
the population size in sanctuary cities in comparison to the existence of sanctuary cities
and the number of sanctuary cities. The third study analyzes the effect of exogenous
migration shocks on the measurements of poverty in Colombia. I find that poverty
measurements are sensitive to the migration shock. Also the policies created from such
measurements have a bias because the poverty measures were affected by the internal
conflict in Colombia.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
1.1

The economics of immigration

Studies of migration have focused on the causes and destination choices of the
population that moved (Ravenstein, 1885, 1889). The work by Ravenstein (1885) and
Ravenstein (1889) focused on understanding what were the amenities and desired features in the destination place by most migrants and what population would move from
one place to another. The study of migration in developing countries increased after the seminal work of Harris and Todaro (1970). Their paper created an analytical
framework that allowed migration to be explained as differences in economic variables
between regions affect the decisions.

This dissertation focuses on the consequences on migration within and from developing countries on destinations. Most of the migrants follow a rationality similar to
the ideas of Harris and Todaro (1970) and the different changes affect their prospective migratory behavior. This dissertation will consider the possible consequences of
migration on economically related issues, such as crime, undocumented migration, and
poverty.

Juan T. Sayago-Gómez

1.2
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Crime and migration

The relationship between migration and crime has recently been on the center
stages of political discussions. Supporters of the relationship use them to justify the
travel bans and other initiatives to restrict the arrival of immigrants. The European
Union (EU) included new countries in 2004 and 2007 and all the new countries are less
developed than the original EU countries. This enlargement allowed migrants to move
freely from these new member countries to the traditional EU members.

Chapter 2 examines the relationship between migration and crime. We focus on
the increased flow of immigrants into the EU countries due to the enlargement of the
EU in 2004 and 2007. It allowed “restricted” immigration from newer members to
the original EU 15 countries. This change in immigration policy provides us with an
experimental case for studying the effect of increased migration on crime. We focus
the analysis on total criminal activities, violent crimes, and property crimes, and highlight possible effects on crimes related to a monetary gain. Property crimes increase
when unemployment of low skilled workers increases because these unemployed people
could be involved in criminal activities. We analyze the NUTS 2 regions of Italy and
Spain from 2003 to 2008, using data from the Eurostat, European national statistical
centers and institutes, and National Police or Ministry of Interior reports. We control for socioeconomic factors related to crime and apply an instrument to control for
migration-crime endogeneity. The coefficients associated with the share of immigrant
population are not significant for all crimes, violent crime, and property crimes.

1.3

Choice of undocumented immigrants

The decision of where to migrate and live by undocumented immigrants has important policy implications because the local labor market receives a group of workers
that arrive at a location and will take jobs. Chapter 3 analyzes what factors affect the
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migration process and what the determinants are in choosing the destination place. I
set up three spatial panel models to analyze the effects from economic variables, as
well as demographic and social characteristics. These variables can push or pull illegal
workers to locate in a specific state of the United States. To explore what factors are
related to the decision of undocumented immigrants, I build a spatial panel model of
the percentage of undocumented population by state for the years from 2005 to 2010.
In the panel, I include economic variables that can attract undocumented workers, such
as real wages and real GDP per capita, since previous studies on migration state that
migrants will move to locations where they can get a higher income or expect one, and
these theories should also affect undocumented immigrants. I use variables for social
networks and sense of safety, such as the status and size of sanctuary cities. The size
of the sanctuary cities is relevant due to the possibility of blending in. Labor market theories are also important to explaining the choices of undocumented immigrants
because the incentives affect low skill employment throughout the country.

1.4

Displacement and poverty

Chapter 4 explores the relationship between internal displacement and changes in
poverty measurements; more specifically how the displaced population affects the measures of poverty by Unsatisfied Basic Needs (UBN) in Colombia for the period from
1993 to 2005. To examine this relationship, first I apply a Shift-Share Decomposition
Analysis to the changes in poverty measurements in Colombian municipalities. This
analysis splits regional change to reduce poverty into three components: national, regional, and sectoral. These components suggest which municipalities really decreased
their non-poor population and compares it with the national trends. This analysis also
highlights that municipalities decreased poverty, but did not increase the number of
non-poor population. Also, displaced population left these municipalities. The municipalities to which they moved increased the non-poor population, thus also affecting
the changes in the poverty rate. I explore the hypothesis that the outcome of the UBN
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measure of poverty is affected by forced migration. I estimate a spatial econometric
model to measure the effect of the displacement of population on the change in poverty.
The model reveals that a large group of rural municipalities reduced poverty through
the displacement of population by the armed groups in Colombia’s conflict. I develop
an alternative model using the newly developed measure called the Multidimensional
Poverty Index (MPI) as the dependent variable. I conclude that forced displacement
did not affect the outcome of the measurement of poverty using the MPI in Colombian
municipalities.

5

Chapter 2

Crime and Migration: The Case
of the European Union
Enlargements of 2004 and 2007
The relationship between immigration and crime has been a policy discussion in
many countries. It has helped to determine the rigidity of immigration requirements,
including the level of security checks required before allowing immigrants to enter the
countries. This chapter examines whether or not increased immigration to Italy and
Spain due to the 2004 and 2007 European Union (EU) enlargements resulted in increased crime.

These enlargements provide an interesting case study because they open borders
into the EU region (see Figure 2.1) to countries from the center and east of Europe.
The enlargement granted the citizens from the new member countries the right to move
freely, choosing where to live and work within the EU (Delbecq and Waldorf, 2010).
On average, the population from the new member countries has lower socio-economic
conditions and lower income, compared with other EU countries. Since income is one
of the main attractors for migration (Harris and Todaro, 1970; Sjaastad, 1962; Greenwood, 1993; Lucas, 1993), an inflow of migrants from the new member countries to
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Chapter 2. Crime and Migration

6

the rest of the EU was expected to occur. These changed migration patterns have
changed labor markets, affecting labor market access as a whole, as well as the kinds
of jobs available (Delbecq and Waldorf, 2010; Giulietti et al., 2013; Kahanec et al.,
2013). Italy and Spain were selected as the focus for three main reasons: First, they
have data available and published online for the period of analysis; second, these two
countries are among the top five immigrant destinations; and third, these countries did
not modify their NUTS 2 during the period under study.

The new countries in the two recent EU enlargements (Figure 2.1) increased the
foreign population that could access the labor market in the previous countries (see
Figure 2.2). This means that low-skilled natives would face greater competition. Additionally, new migrants who could not find work would have to return to their countries
or resort to illegal activities. The EU15 countries1 set up some restrictions that were
intended to limit the migration, but, according to previous research, those restrictions
“had a very weak effect” (Delbecq and Waldorf, 2010). The size of the immigrant
population in Italy and Spain increased from 1.9 million to 4.5 million. The number
of immigrants increased in both countries from 2003 to 2008. For the same period the
number of crimes increased in Italy at least through 2007. In Spain, the pattern was
highly variable (see Figures 2.3 and 2.4).

Previous work addressing the relationship between crime and migration has found
mixed evidence. Some papers found a positive and significant correlation between crime
and migration (Spenkuch, 2014; Borjas et al., 2006; Bianchi et al., 2012), while others have not found significant relationships (Butcher and Piehl, 1998; Le Brun, 2008;
Moehling and Piehl, 2007; Bell et al., 2013; Bell and Machin, 2013). This study focuses
on the EU enlargement. The population migrating in this enlargement differs from the
previous European studies that consider refugee populations, because these migrants
are choosing where to migrate and when. This difference yields a better understanding
1

Countries that were members before 2004.

Juan Tomás Sayago-Gómez
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Figure 2.1: Timeline of the European Union Enlargements. Source: Delbecq and
Waldorf (2010) and European Union (2013)

of the expected effect of the EU enlargement on countries’ crime rates. Furthermore,
the evidence for European migration has mainly focused on the United Kingdom. This
chapter focuses on Italy and Spain. These countries are more accessible for migrants,
who face lower transportation costs to move compared with moving to the United
Kingdom.

I develop a panel of data to study the effect of increased immigration on crime
rates. The panel focuses on the period from 2003 to 2008. This period was chosen to
avoid the effects of the 2009 crisis when many likely were forced into illegal activities to
overcome the difficult economic situation. The results suggest that, after controlling for
other variables that correlate with crime, the increase in immigration did not increase
crime rates.

This chapter is divided into six sections: Following this Introduction, I review the
associated literature. Then I describe the methodological approach and the data. In
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Figure 2.2: Total Foreign Born Population by Country. Source: European Union (2013)

the last two sections, I present the results and draw conclusions.

2.1

Theoretical and empirical literature

Some recent studies have found a positive linkage between immigration and all
criminal activities, property crime, or incarceration rates, while others have found the
connection to be insignificant. These studies have focused mainly on the United States
and European countries, due to the large number of immigrants that move to these
countries. These countries have been at the center of political discussions related to
their immigration policies. Some politicians have expressed strong feelings against foreigners and blamed immigration for higher crime rates. Research provides an opportunity to step away from these emotional reactions. I begin by discussing the theoretical
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Figure 2.3: Crime Counts and Foreign Population in Italy. Source: Italian National
Institute of Statistics (ISTAT)

basis for understanding the relationship between immigration and crime. Then I turn
to a discussion of the current empirical literature.

Since Becker (1968), studies of the determinants of crime identify the benefits and
costs of committing criminal activities. Spenkuch (2014), based on Becker’s arguments,
explains that if the expected utility from committing a crime differs between immigrants
and natives and the outside options are worse for immigrants, the number of crimes
and the crime rate should increase as the number of immigrants increases. However,
Butcher and Piehl (1998) argued that immigrants face higher costs of criminal activity as they may serve longer terms than natives, either because they are given longer
sentences or are less likely to be paroled.

Demographic characteristics are another potential link between immigration and
crime. Immigrants tend to be young (between ages of 15 and 25) and are more likely to
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Figure 2.4: Crime Counts and Foreign Population in Spain. Source: the Department
of State of Spain, and the National Institute of Statistics of Spain (INE)

be male. This demographic is more prone than other groups to be involved in criminal
activity (Moehling and Piehl, 2007; Spenkuch, 2014).

Butcher and Piehl (1998) also argued that immigrants may have an adverse impact
on crime by crowding natives out of the legal sector. If immigrants adversely affect natives’ legal alternatives by taking jobs or overburdening the welfare system, low-skilled
natives may increase their involvement in criminal activities. The authors state that
this relationship also found that immigrants are more likely than natives to commit
crimes when they are unable to be employed because of cultural difficulties and lack of
a supportive network. The authors explain that immigrants may be more likely to be
apprehended or convicted than natives because immigrants do not have the the same
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legal knowledge.

Additionally Le Brun (2008) analyzed the channels of social disorganization theory and the way they affect immigrants and their relationship with crime. Le Brun
(2008) stated that “According to social disorganization theory, four factors weaken the
informal controls against crime: poverty, ethnic heterogeneity, residential mobility, and
family.” Immigrants usually have a lower income than the natives, have a different
origin which contributes to ethnic heterogeneity, have moved away from their place of
origin, and are more likely to be far from their family. However, Le Brun (2008) explained that immigrants could be related to fewer criminal activities in the case of the
United States, because the social disorganization theory does not affect immigrants,
whose experiences as migrants modify their view of their living conditions.

The arguments espoused by Le Brun (2008) apply to the EU enlargement immigrants because these immigrants faced conditions similar to immigrants in the United
States. According to Lebrun’s arguments, immigrants to the EU area earn an average
income lower than natives. However, the earnings are higher in the host country than
in their home country, in which case they might not consider themselves as poor (see
Table 2.1). Immigrants contribute to ethnic heterogeneity. However, immigrants tend
to locate in areas where other immigrants live so that they are not singled out. They
sometimes separate themselves from family. However, they usually find in their host
country a group of people who serve as their “foster family” so that they do not feel so
alone. However, migrants to the EU countries do not need to get a visa, which reduces
both the requirements and the costs to migrate.

The empirical literature offers mixed results. As already stated, some show a positive relationship, while the majority have found insignificant relationships between
crime and immigration. Positive results have been found by Borjas et al. (2006), Bianchi
et al. (2012) and Spenkuch (2014). Borjas et al. (2006) explored the crowding out effect
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in the labor market. Borjas et al. (2006) found evidence that immigration crowded out
low-skilled workers (black men). As the number of immigrants increased, the wage of
low-skill black workers fell, their employment rate declined, and their incarceration rate
rose. Spenkuch (2014) estimated a panel of counties in the United States from 1980
to 2000 and found evidence of a positive relationship between crime and immigration.
This result is stronger when studying crimes that involved an economic gain or loot
from the criminal activity.

Other studies, such as Bianchi et al. (2012), found evidence that increased immigration to Italian provinces affected only property crimes significantly. Their analysis
showed that crimes related to financial gain have a positive correlation even after including instruments. The authors highlighted as motives for increased crime the fact
that immigrants to Italian provinces face lower wages and had lower legitimate earning
opportunities because of their different demographic characteristics. However, their
cost for crime could be greater because of the probability of incarceration.

Analyses for the United Kingdom were presented by Bell and Machin (2013) and
Bell et al. (2013). Bell and Machin (2013) find a significant positive correlation between
immigration and property crime in the United Kingdom. This result is significant after
controlling for other correlated variables. However, this relationship was only related to
asylum seekers and specifically to males. They also found positive correlation between
arrest rates and the share of population coming from the EU countries that entered
in 2004. Bell et al. (2013) also found a positive correlation between property crimes
and the wave of immigration from 1990-2000 in the United Kingdom as well as a small
negative impact for the immigration wave post the 2004 enlargement of the European
Union. Their results are explained by differences in labor market opportunities for the
different migrant groups.

Some papers have not found evidence of a significant correlation between crime and
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immigration; Butcher and Piehl (1998) and Le Brun (2008) focused on Metropolitan
Statistical Areas in the United States and found, after instrumenting, that the correlation is not significant. Jaitman and Machin (2013) found similar results for England
and Wales. Their paper included immigration into England and Wales from the first
EU enlargement analyzed in this article (2004).

A recent trend in research has focused on the legal status of immigrants and criminal
activities. Mastrobuoni and Pinotti (2015) have the only paper that has explored the
re-arrest probabilities based on the EU enlargement of 2004. Their results show that
recidivism decreases, but mainly in places where labor opportunities for immigrants
are better. The ideas by D’Amuri and Peri (2014) on the immigration consequences on
the European labor market also support this result. The authors explain that routine
jobs are taken by immigrants while low-skill natives take on more complex jobs. Baker
(2015) uses time-series analysis to examine the efects of the Immigration Reform and
Control Act (IRCA) from 1986 in the United States and its relationship with all crimes,
violent crimes, and property crimes. The results showed a negative correlation, which
was stronger for property crimes. Nunziata (2015) also explored the effect of legal
status and the victimization and perception of crime in the European Union countries.
Nunziata (2015) showed that an increase in the number of immigrants does not affect
victimization, but is positively correlated with an increase in fear of crime.

These results leave the possible effect open to question because there could be specific conditions where crime has increased or particular scenarios in the labor market
that could be relevant for study. Studying immigration into Italy and Spain differs
substantially from the cases of the United States and the United Kingdom with respect to costs of migration. Immigrants need to apply for a visa to achieve access into
the United States, while immigrants into the United Kingdom faced higher settlement
costs compared to the other countries in the European Union. This likely results in
the selection bias of immigrants to these countries.
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Estimation methodology

I estimate a panel data model of crime and immigration. The logarithm of the
crime rate (Ln(CR)) is the dependent variable, where the crime rate (CR) is defined
as the sum of crimes in time t and administrative unit i divided by the population for
the same t and i. The model uses the logarithm of the crime rates (dependent variable)
and the independent variables. This transformation allows us to find the constant elasticity as the coefficient:

CRit =

#Crimesit
P opulationit

(2.1)

The model uses the share of immigrants (SI) in the region as an independent variable. The share of immigrants (SI) is defined as:

SIit =

Immigrantsit
P opulationit

(2.2)

The model to estimate is:

Ln(CRit ) = β0 + β1 SIit + αXit + uit

(2.3)

where Xit is a set of time varying regional controls. They are included according to previous studies that analyze the determinants of crime. The list of Xit control variables
includes the natural logarithm of the Gross Regional Product by Region (Log(GRP )),
share of male population(P CT M ale), rate of unemployment(U nemployment), fraction of young population2 (P CT 15 − 24), and the natural logarithm of the density of
2

I include the share of population between the ages of 15 to 24. The models were estimated using
the population between 20 to 24 years old; however, the results are better using the group from 15 to
24.
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population(Log(Density)).

Most of the panel data models use a one-way error component (see equation (2.4)),
designated as the uit . It will be split into µi , also known as the unobservable individualspecific effect, and vit , the disturbance after accounting for the effect (Baltagi, 2005).
Panel data methodologies suggest two ways to address these effects. The first is the
fixed effects model, which assumes that the µi are parameters fixed to be estimated and
the vit are disturbances that are stochastic, independent, and identically distributed
IID(0, σv2 ). The second method is the random effects model. The assumption in the
random effects model is that µit ∼ IID(0, σµ2 ), vit ∼ IID(0, σv2 ), and µit is independent
of vit . The selection of which effect to use is done by using the Hausman test (Baltagi, 2005). Baltagi (2005) explains that the Hausman test is based on the difference
between the fixed and random effects estimators.

uit = µi + vit

(2.4)

The Hausman test compares the coefficients from random and fixed effects estimators under the null hypothesis that both models are consistent. Rejection will mean
that the random effects is not consistent and asymptotically efficient under the H0
(Hausman, 1978; Baltagi, 2005).

This specification has certain issues: the first one could be reverse causality, because immigrants may avoid cities with high crime rates (de Sousa, 2014). This issue
will bias β1 downwards. The second issue is that the intensity of immigration has a
correlation with other variables that help explain variation in crime, such as employment rates and wages (Harris and Todaro, 1970; Borjas et al., 2006). The inclusion of
these variables may not allow observation of the effect of immigration on crime rates
and yet excluding them could lead to omitted variable bias (Le Brun, 2008).
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Another issue is the potential for measurement errors when accounting for the number of immigrants, especially with a transient population and illegal immigrants. This
issue could affect the β1 and create a bias, which could be either positive or negative.
Another measurement error issue comes from crime data, which might suffer from under reporting. Also there is a lot of variation in reporting standards between regions.
In this case, large cities could report less crime and the crime rates will be downwardly
biased, which will bias the effect estimated from immigration rates in the OLS approach
and the instrumental variable estimations. However this issue could be present in all
crime models.

All these issues are consistent with endogeneity of some right-hand regressors (Baltagi, 2005). Baltagi (2005) describes this as the correlation between the right-hand side
regressors and disturbances in a panel data model and argues that this might be due to
all described issues. The solution to most of these issues comes from instrumental variable methodology. This approach uses an instrumental variable to solve the problem of
possible endogeneity. The instrumental variable used was defined by Saiz (2007) and
Le Brun (2008). Equation (2.5) represents the instrumental variable used in the model
to solve the endogeneity problem. The instrument (Inst) considers the participation
of immigrants (P I) in region i over all the immigrants during the previous CENSUS3
and the Share of Immigrants (SI) of total population in the current year t for region i.
This type of instrument depends on the assumption that the locations where immigrants
settle do not change by “persistent shocks” over time and are uncorrelated with crime
variables (Jaitman and Machin, 2013). Additionally it states that immigrants move to
areas with other immigrants. Furthermore, the advantage from such an instrument is
that current crime rates will not affect the past regional distribution of migrants because it will solve the issue of reverse causality. The instrumental variable is defined as:

3

The previous census that I use was from the year 1991 for both countries.
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(2.5)

The regressions results from this analysis will include the model estimated for All
Crimes (Total Crimes), Property Crimes, and Violent Crimes. Each regression considers the effect of the different variables on the crime rate by type of crime.

Further evaluations of changes in immigrant populations require that we explore
the increases in the number of immigrants from specific groups of regional origins. We
estimate the increases of immigrant population from three large groups of nationalities.
The three regions that I use to explore the increases in these populations are European,
African and South and Central American countries (Latin American). Keep in mind
that the only group that should have abruptly increased the inmigration flow is the
European population. These groups have been targeted and blamed for causing crime
increases previously by politicians and other groups. These three regions are considered related to increases in crime in Europe and United States. However, due to the
enlargement of the EU regions, the number of immigrants increased (see figure 2.2),
because citizens from European countries faced a decrease in the requirements to enter
the EU countries.

The model to estimate the particular effect of the increase of a specific group of
immigrants divides the immigrant population into the specific group and the rest of the
immigrants. Equation (2.6) divides the migrant population variable into the share of
immigrants from Europe, Africa, and Latin America (SIxr), and the share of the rest of
the immigrants (SIrestr) (Le Brun, 2008). Where the x = {Europe, Af rica, Latin America}.

Ln(CRit ) = β0 + β1 SIxrit + β2 SIrestrit + αXit + uit

(2.6)

The analysis proposed in equation (2.6) has the same issues described above. It

Juan Tomás Sayago-Gómez
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requires instrumental variables for (SIxr) and (SIrestr). The instrument for for the
Share of Immigrants from region X (Instxr) in equation (2.7) uses the share of immigrants from region X and the participation of immigrants in the region over all the
regions from the 1991 Census. The instrument for the Share of Immigrants from the
rest (Instrestr) in equation (2.8) uses the share of immigrants from the rest of regions
and the participation of immigrants in the region over all the regions from the 1991
Census (Le Brun, 2008). This instrument is similar to the one used by Le Brun (2008),
however, it was not possible to find population by region for all regions in the 1991
census.

Instxri,t = (SIit ) × (P Ii,1991 ) =

Immigrants f rom Xit
P opulationit

!

!

Immigrantsi,1991
PN

i=1 Immigrantsi,1991

(2.7)

Instresti,t = (SIit )×(P Ii,1991 ) =

Immigrants f rom restit
P opulationit

!

Immigrantsi,1991
PN

i=1 Immigrantsi,1991

(2.8)

2.3

Data description

The data used in this chapter are from a yearly panel of NUTS2 regions4 of two
European countries: Italy and Spain. The data panel includes observations from 2003
to 2008. Information on regional economic characteristics is published by Eurostat and
the National Institutes of Statistics from each country. The panel consists of six years
of data for two countries and 39 NUTS2 regions per year.

2.3.1

Dependent variables

The crime rates are calculated using equation (2.1), which measures the crimes per
person by administrative unit. The crime information utilized for the estimation comes
4

According to Eurostat, NUTS2 areas are basic regions for the application of regional policies
(European Union, 2013).

!
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from different sources for each country, such as annual police reports and reports from
the ministry of the interior and specific crime agencies. All information is published
for NUTS 2 areas. Crimes are classified into two broad categories: property crime and
violent crime. I have three measures of crime: total crime, property crime, and violent
crime.
Total crime includes all crimes and is the sum of property crime and violent crime.
Property crime includes all crimes that involve money, property, or some other benefit:
burglary, larceny, theft, motor vehicle theft, arson, shoplifting, and vandalism. Violent
crimes includes all crimes for which the offender uses or threatens to use force upon
a victim: murder, nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, assault, robbery, and aggravated assault. Total crime averages 104,259.5 crimes per NUTS 2 administrative
unit and year, with a standard deviation of 115,258.8. Property crimes have a mean of
55,676.97 crimes, with a standard deviation of 65,424.93. The crime types are defined
in a similar way for both countries so that they can be comparable between units.

2.3.2

Independent variables

The independent variables included are controls and migration variables. The variables used to account for migration come from national institutes of statistics from each
country. These institutions report the number of foreign people living in each region.
The foreign population includes all the population that does not have the country’s
citizenship, e.g., the population that was born outside of Italy and does not have Italian citizenship.

This foreign population is by classification of the region of birth for each NUTS2
unit. The average Share of Immigrant population in the NUTS2 regions is 4.365 percent, and the standard deviation is 2.897 percent. The presence of illegal immigrants
creates a measurement error or undercount of immigrants. This is addressed by using
the instrumental variable approach.
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The controls include the Population Density, Real Gross Domestic Product, Unemployment Rate, Percentage of Young Population, and Percentage of Male Population.
These variables are available on the Eurostat website, and all of these variables are
available for NUTS2 regions (European Union, 2013). Table 2.2 presents the summary
statistics for the variables used in the analysis.

Table 2.1: GDP per capita in European Countries. Source: EUROSTAT.

Country

Member since

GDP Per capita
2006

GDP Per capita
2007

Cyprus
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Malta
Poland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Bulgaria
Romania
Croatia
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom

2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2007
2007
2013
Before 2004
Before 2004
Before 2004
Before 2004
Before 2004
Before 2004
Before 2004
Before 2004
Before 2004
Before 2004
Before 2004
Before 2004
Before 2004
Before 2004
Before 2004

23600
14400
12200
10200
9200
8700
15000
8000
10700
17500
4500
5600
10700
34500
33100
46000
35500
31000
31000
22000
39800
28500
77800
37600
16800
24100
39300
30000

24200
15200
13300
10300
10200
9800
15500
8600
11900
18600
4900
6100
11200
35700
34000
46200
37200
31500
32100
22700
40700
28700
82900
38900
17200
24500
40400
30500
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics.

Statistic
Total Crimes
Property Crimes
Violent Crimes
Population
Density
GDP
Unemployment rate
Share population in age 15 - 24
Share of Male Population
Foreign Population
Foreign from Europe
Foreign from EU 15
Foreign from Center
and East Europe
Foreign from Other
European Countries
Foreign from Africa
Foreign from Latin
America

2.4

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Max

104,259.500
55,676.970
48,582.510
2,614,262.000
273.231
63,416.900
0.085
0.111
0.490
122,821.200
53,935.850
16,517.570
35,916.910

115,258.800
65,424.930
51,868.390
2,315,105.000
676.307
64,415.640
0.044
0.019
0.008
157,841.600
63,936.820
26,038.120
47,503.500

1,712
510
1,086
120,909
22.700
2,374
0.018
0.075
0.472
2,114
146
89
19

553,847
328,267
237,933
9,642,406
4,433.254
327,829
0.250
0.158
0.507
860,575
305,068
136,202
267,639

1,501.372

5,072.179

3

54,424

27,088.770
25,074.220

42,085.430
46,690.880

8
37

266,542
285,534

Results

Tables 2.3, 2.5, and 2.7 show that the panel models selected should be random
effects models. The first column in Tables 2.3, 2.5, and 2.7 reveals that all models
need to include individual fixed effects estimates because the F test for the presence
of fixed effects rejects the null hypothesis. The second column of the Tables 2.3, 2.5,
and 2.7 confirm that the fixed effects model with individual effects does not need to
include time fixed effects. The models that test for the need to include time effects
does not reject the null hypothesis. The third column tests the presence of random
effects against the pooled model. Finally the fourth column shows the Hausman tests,
the Hausman tests do not reject the null hypothesis, and this evidence suggests using
random effects models might be adequate.

Juan Tomás Sayago-Gómez
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Table 2.3: Testing procedures to the Panel models.

Total Crimes and All foreigns panel model

Test
p-value
Note:

F Test for
Individual
Fixed Effects
213.28
0.000

F Test for
Time
Fixed Effects
2.429
0.119

Breusch-Pagan
Lagrange Multiplier
for random effects
444.13
0.000

Hausman
Test
1.8122
0.9361

∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01

This result is similar to the reassessment done by Baltagi (2006) to the crime panel
model of North Carolina. Baltagi (2006) suggests that to test for a contrast between
fixed and random effects you have to consider the endogeneity of the independent variables. Baltagi (2006) also explains that the usual Hausman test leads to a misleading
inference among the regressors and proposes an alternative version of the Hausman
test based on the effects estimated using instrumental variables. The application of
this methodology provides results that support using the random effects model.

The regression results that relate immigration and total crime in the EU region
are in Table 2.4. The first column of results is for the pooled model, which does not
include effects estimates and shows a bias in the coefficient associated with the share of
immigrants. The model shows a positive correlation between Total Crime and the share
of immigrants in the NUTS 2 regions in the pooling model. Columns two and three include the fixed effects models. Both models show interesting results for the significance
of the share of immigrants and other controls included. Previous research has always
used fixed effects models and found similar results to the results in Table 2.4. Finally
the fourth column includes the random effects models which, according to the testing
results, is the model that fits best the results. The model with random effects shows a
positive relationship between GDP and total crime, and another positive relationship
between the share of population between the ages of 15 and 24. Furthermore, there is
a negative and non-significant coefficient associated with the share of immigrants.
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Table 2.4: Panel Model Results for Total Crimes. Results in parenthesis are the standard errors.

Pooled

Fixed

Fixed

Individual

Time

IV

IV

IV

IV

Share of immigrants

0.405∗∗∗
(0.145)

−0.043
(0.118)

−0.558∗∗
(0.269)

−0.025
(0.046)

Log of Density

−0.137
(0.116)

0.677
(4.525)

0.378∗∗
(0.175)

−0.008
(1.617)

−0.348∗∗
(0.144)

0.918
(0.700)

0.932∗∗
(0.381)

0.818∗∗
(0.414)

2.359
(2.754)

0.041
(0.981)

−13.257∗∗
(6.695)

−0.073
(0.684)

36.288∗∗∗
(13.231)

14.318∗∗∗
(5.225)

−20.385
(16.505)

13.854∗∗∗
(4.276)

−136.443∗∗∗
(45.287)

−1.310
(40.668)

148.777∗
(76.516)

−6.550
(23.655)

Log of GDP

Unemployment Rate

Share Population Age 15-24

Share of Male population

Constant

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Note:

73.174∗∗∗
(21.971)
234
0.115
0.111

Random

1.219
(19.643)
234
0.129
0.104

234
0.049
0.047

234
0.140
0.136

∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01

=The regression results focused on property crime are in table 2.6. The pooling
model also exhibits a positive and significant correlation between the Rate of foreign
and the crime rate. This bias disappears with the fixed effects models (similar to previous research). The random effects model reveals that the coefficient that correlates
property crime and GDP is positive and significant, as the criminals will commit more
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Table 2.5: Testing procedures to the Panel models

Property Crimes and All foreigns panel model

Test
p-value

F Test for
Individual
Fixed Effects
235.560
0.000

Note:

F Test for
Time
Fixed Effects
2.779
0.095

Breusch-Pagan
Lagrange Multiplier
for random effects
264.820
0.000

Hausman
Test
0.451
0.998

∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01

crimes when the payout from such offenses could be higher, and the coefficient for the
share of the population between the age of 15 and 24 is also positive and significant.
Finally, the coefficient associated with the percentage of immigrants is negative and
not significant.

Table 2.8 shows the results for violent crimes. The pooled model results also find
a positive and significant correlation between the share of immigrants and the crime
rate for violent crime and the fixed effects models also find a negative coefficient which
is only significant in the case of time fixed effects. The random effects model reveals a
positive and non-significant coefficient for immigrant share, while the coefficients associated with the GDP and the share of young population have positive and significant
coefficients.

The results from the three random effects models indicate that the increase in foreign population is not associated with the increases in crime rates for the different
NUTS 2 regions. Crimes are positively associated with GDP and the share of young
population.

The individual analysis for different regional groups of origin are presented in Tables 2.9, 2.10, and 2.11. The groups analyzed include only immigrants coming from
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Table 2.6: Panel Model Results for Property Crimes. Results in parenthesis are the
standard errors.

Pooled

Fixed

Fixed

Individual

Time

IV

IV

IV

IV

Share of immigrants

0.485∗∗∗
(0.169)

0.104
(0.131)

−0.614∗∗
(0.301)

0.023
(0.048)

Log of Density

−0.154
(0.136)

−3.900
(5.035)

0.436∗∗
(0.196)

−0.718
(1.669)

−0.368∗∗
(0.168)

0.348
(0.779)

1.100∗∗
(0.426)

0.739∗
(0.430)

2.392
(3.217)

−0.764
(1.091)

−15.368∗∗
(7.495)

−0.297
(0.713)

41.817∗∗∗
(15.454)

17.221∗∗∗
(5.814)

−23.659
(18.478)

18.808∗∗∗
(4.457)

−157.448∗∗∗
(52.898)

−63.011
(45.250)

169.702∗∗
(85.662)

−39.196
(24.604)

Log of GDP

Unemployment Rate

Share Population Age 15-24

Share of Male population

Constant

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2

82.055∗∗∗
(25.663)
234
0.129
0.125

Note:

Random

20.056
(20.346)
234
0.111
0.090

234
0.029
0.027

234
0.181
0.176

∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01

European countries, Latin American countries, and African countries 5 . The results
included in Tables 2.9, 2.10, and 2.11 are the random effects models. The three columns
show the coefficients and standard errors.

Table 2.9 shows the regression results focused on how the share of immigrants from
5

I do not include immigrants from the Middle East, because the number of immigrants from this
origin is very low.
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Table 2.7: Testing procedures to the Panel models

Data Panel Testing results for model Violent Crimes and All foreigns

Test
p-value

F Test for
Individual
Fixed Effects
48.023
0.000

F Test for
Time
Fixed Effects
2.167
0.141

Note:

Breusch-Pagan
Lagrange Multiplier
for random effects
281.610
0.000

Hausman
Test
0.451
0.998

∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01

European countries affects the three crime categories. Random effects models reveal
that the increase in the share of immigrants immigrants has a positive and significant
relationship only with property crimes, with an insignificant effects on all crimes and
violent crimes. The correlation observed for GDP and share of young population is
positive and significant. The coefficient for foreign population from the rest of the
world is negative and significant. This result suggests a positive relationship between
arrival of immigrants and property crimes only, which could be related to the economic
necessities from immigrants and crowded-out low skilled workers.

Tables 2.10 and 2.11 include the regression results for the other two groups that
have been associated with criminal activities by locals (Latin Americans and Africans).
The results associated with these two groups show a negative and significant relationship associated with the immigration of Latin Americans and Africans. The coefficients
associated with GDP show a positive and significant relationship with property crimes.
The results for GDP and the share of the population age 15 to 24 are positive and
significant for the analysis using the share of African immigrants and not significant
for the case of Latin American immigrants.
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Table 2.8: Panel Model Results for Violent Crimes. Results in parenthesis are the
standard errors.

Pooled

Fixed

Fixed

Individual

Time

IV

IV

IV

IV

Share of immigrants

0.286∗∗
(0.119)

−0.305
(0.196)

−0.516∗∗
(0.244)

−0.075∗
(0.038)

Log of Density

−0.093
(0.095)

9.366
(7.528)

0.333∗∗
(0.159)

0.425
(1.141)

−0.291∗∗
(0.118)

2.005∗
(1.164)

0.763∗∗
(0.346)

0.834∗
(0.442)

Unemployment Rate

1.750
(2.258)

1.318
(1.631)

−11.543∗
(6.075)

−0.054
(0.776)

Share Population Age 15-24

27.949∗∗
(10.845)

12.701
(8.692)

−17.593
(14.976)

7.656
(4.965)

−102.423∗∗∗
(37.120)

102.734
(67.648)

132.076∗
(69.428)

35.040
(25.489)

Log of GDP

Share of Male population

Constant

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2

234
0.096
0.093

−32.726∗
(17.524)
234
0.066
0.054

234
0.069
0.066

234
0.109
0.106

∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01

Note:

2.5

44.988∗∗
(18.009)

Random

Conclusions

This chapter explores one quasi-natural experiment regarding the possible effects
on crime from the EU enlargement. Since the EU enlargement, we have seen a yearly
increase of approximately 26 percent of immigrants going to Italy and Spain (see figure
2.2). The number of immigrants doubled in the period from 2003 to 2008. The number
of crimes also increased during the same period. The current approach includes other

Juan Tomás Sayago-Gómez
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Table 2.9: Panel Model Results for All types of Crimes using European immigrants. All
results use the random effects model. Results in parenthesis are the standard errors.

All Crimes

Property Crimes

Violent Crimes

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.033
(0.031)

0.073∗∗
(0.032)

−0.021
(0.031)

−0.081∗∗
(0.033)

−0.054
(0.035)

−0.102∗∗∗
(0.034)

Log of Density

−0.019
(0.738)

−0.178
(0.793)

0.080
(0.504)

Log of GDP

0.713∗∗
(0.355)

0.699∗
(0.371)

0.642∗
(0.375)

Unemployment Rate

0.049
(0.642)

−0.074
(0.667)

−0.074
(0.743)

Share Population Age 15-24

10.846∗∗
(4.182)

15.810∗∗∗
(4.347)

4.728
(4.755)

Share of Male population

1.889
(20.999)

−25.222
(21.865)

35.912
(23.717)

Constant

−1.415
(13.396)

11.382
(14.064)

−29.153∗∗
(13.808)

234
0.164
0.159

234
0.211
0.204

234
0.125
0.121

Share of immigrants from Europe

Share of immigrants from not Europe

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Note:

∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01

control variables that affect crime and addresses the issue of a reverse causality with
the instrumental variable approach.

The results show after including the other control variables and applying the instrumental variable approach, a negative but insignificant relationship between the
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Table 2.10: Panel Model Results for All types of Crimes for Latin immigrants. All
results use the random effects model. Results in parenthesis are the standard errors.

All Crimes

Property Crimes

Violent Crimes

(1)

(2)

(3)

−0.126∗∗∗
(0.044)

−0.140∗∗∗
(0.046)

−0.094∗
(0.050)

Share of immigrants from not Latin America

0.016
(0.021)

0.052∗∗
(0.023)

−0.028
(0.023)

Log of Density

0.044
(0.220)

0.041
(0.264)

0.062
(0.166)

Log of GDP

0.372
(0.238)

0.368
(0.270)

0.321
(0.201)

Unemployment Rate

−0.378
(0.633)

−0.492
(0.659)

−0.442
(0.732)

Share Population Age 15-24

6.216
(4.047)

9.966∗∗
(4.306)

1.877
(4.374)

Share of Male population

0.296
(19.042)

−18.972
(20.382)

18.837
(19.280)

Constant

3.141
(10.377)

11.399
(11.201)

−17.077∗
(10.287)

234
0.097
0.093

234
0.159
0.154

234
0.065
0.062

Share of immigrants from Latin America

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Note:

∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01

share of immigrants and all crimes, property crimes, and violent crimes. The coefficients associated with variables like GDP and share of young population are positive
and significant; similar to results from previous literature. This lack of significance of
immigrants shows that the increase in crime might not be necessarily related to the
increase in immigration. However, when dividing the share of immigrants into regional
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Table 2.11: Panel Model Results for All types of Crimes for African immigrants. All
results use the random effects model. Results in parenthesis are the standard errors.
All Crimes

Property Crimes

Violent Crimes

(1)

(2)

(3)

−0.158∗∗∗
(0.042)

−0.118∗∗∗
(0.044)

−0.176∗∗∗
(0.047)

Share of immigrants from not Africa

0.022
(0.026)

0.049∗
(0.028)

−0.010
(0.028)

Log of Density

−0.109
(0.348)

−0.150
(0.372)

0.015
(0.236)

Log of GDP

0.767∗∗
(0.302)

0.760∗∗
(0.319)

0.496∗
(0.262)

Log of Density

0.097
(0.644)

−0.065
(0.675)

−0.116
(0.727)

Share Population Age 15-24

14.713∗∗∗
(4.068)

19.865∗∗∗
(4.272)

6.043
(4.317)

Unemployment Rate

−5.662
(19.892)

−31.622
(20.887)

22.673
(20.641)

Share Population Age 15-24

1.682
(11.302)

13.254
(11.889)

−21.050∗
(11.313)

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
F Statistic (df = 7; 226)

234
0.129
0.124
−31.497

234
0.149
0.144
−31.334

234
0.108
0.104
−30.161

Share of immigrants from Africa

Note:

∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01

groups of origin such as European, Latin American, and African, the results support
that these immigrant groups are not related to total crimes and violent crimes. The
random effects model revealed a positive and significant relationship between to the
presence of European immigrants and property crime.
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The increase in immigrants to these two countries (Italy and Spain) presents an
interesting quasi-experimental case, which differs significantly from the immigration
into the United States, and England due to implicit selection bias in the costs to
migrate. The results only find evidence partially similar to the previous literature that
claims immigration is correlated with property crime because this result holds only for
immigration from European countries. Additionally, D’Amuri and Peri (2014) propose
an alternative explanation, they state that the immigrants join the labor market and
take the low-skilled jobs while local workers take on more complex jobs.

32

Chapter 3

Determinants of Undocumented
Immigrants’ Choice to Locate in
United States
The decision of where to migrate and live by undocumented immigrants has important policy implications because the immigrants come to the labor market and affect
the supply and demand for jobs as well as the utilities, education system, health, and
other goods that are needed. This chapter analyzes the determinants that affect the
location choice of undocumented immigrants. The analysis will consider economic and
social variables that have been considered important in explaining migration.

Also, I set up a spatial panel model, this model allows us to consider spatial spillover
effects that affect the decision of migrants when they select the state to which they are
going to migrate to. The panel part of the model allows us to consider changes in time
as part of the dynamic of population changes and velocity of increase in the share of
undocumented immigrants. Previous immigration theories stated that migrants would
move to locations where they can get a higher income or expect one (Sjaastad, 1962;
Harris and Todaro, 1970), therefore we could expect that undocumented immigrants
will consider their income expectations as well as other variables such as costs and risks
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when choosing an location.

Migration of the undocumented population shares certain characteristics with the
internal migration decision in developed and developing countries and other characteristics with the international migration literature, because they search for the bestexpected income and they are looking for a social network that could help them achieve
this goal. An undocumented immigrant is a migrant who does not possess a valid immigration document, because the migrant either entered the country illegally, stayed
longer than the temporary visa permitted, or violated the terms of their admission. The
migrant is initially considered an international migrant, but after living in the country,
the migrant behaves like an internal migrant also moving around without much restriction, looking for the place where they can get the best conditions and find safety. The
migrant is inclined to blend in and try not to be spotted by or get attention from the
authorities.

The aim of this chapter is to thoroughly test the determinants of undocumented
immigration, based on the theory of economic incentives that attract and costs that
decrease the motives of migrants to move to a state. This chapter exploits the differences between wages, incomes, and costs of consumption as attractors and deterrents
for undocumented immigrants. The study also looks if undocumented immigrants take
jobs from low-skilled native workers or if there is a separate underground labor demand
that hires unauthorized immigrants. Firms will not pay high salaries because an undocumented immigrant is not legally authorized to work. The existence of a social network
will help the immigrant find a job quickly and sanctuary cities, as argued by Cebula
(2016a), provide an environment that decreases the sense of risk for the immigrant and
allows him to progress faster.

This study improves the literature because it can provide evidence of changes in
immigration and the relevant features that attract workers to sanctuary cities. The
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possibility of understanding the dynamic and spatial spillovers from variables on the
settlement of undocumented immigrants can provide support to strengthen the discussion about laws and immigration. It will highlight the changes through time and on
which areas to focus regarding labor market controls. Our approach to the job market
improves our knowledge about what attract immigrants. This analysis also improves on
the literature related to the determinants of the location of undocumented immigrants
because it considers variations over time to be relevant and this can improve the policy
implications and the discussion about immigration laws in Congress. By arguying that
policies may disperse undocumented immigrants to states where they were not present
before.

The results from this study show that income expectations attract workers and
costs deter them. The social network is relevant; however, the surge of sanctuary cities
have reinforced their effect. Workers will move to places that have a better social environment. Spatial spillovers affect the migrant’s decisions and could be relevant to
explain further migrational movements.

This chapter is composed of six sections including this introduction, Section 3.1
reviews the literature related to undocumented immigration. Section 3.2 describes the
data used in this study, and Section 3.3 presents the methodology used. Section 3.4
explains the results and Section 3.5 presents the main conclusions.

3.1

Migration theory

The literature related to undocumented migration is fairly recent and rapidly growing. It initially focused on the theoretical background and the factors that interact to
affect the decisions of the agents. The second branch of research focused on proposing
different methods to estimate the number of undocumented immigrants. Further devel-
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opments allowed for the third branch of research that focused on empirical studies that
would look at the determinants of undocumented immigration, the effect of different
policies and outcomes on the labor market from undocumented immigration.

The theoretical developments began with the model proposed by Ethier (1986).
Ethier proposes a model that extends Harris-Todaro’s framework to consider unauthorized immigration, border, and internal enforcement. The model is an extension
of Harris-Todaro, based on a disequilibrium in incomes that creates the stimulus to
move(Harris and Todaro, 1970; Ethier, 1986). The model allows for a mix of policy
that considers border enforcement and internal enforcement. Ethier’s model was extended by Bond and Chen (1987), evaluating the optimal level of domestic enforcement.
They find that the optimal level of enforcement and the enforcement costs make the
enforcement policy less efficient. Djajic (1987) analyzes the problem focusing on the
mechanisms that create the stimulus to move from the source country. Djajic (1987)
concentrates on immigration policies and its role in the mechanism that affects the
labor market. According to Djajic the mechanism is transferred from one country to
another. Further theoretical developments provide a more complex structure, Bandyopadhyay and Bandyopadhyay (1998) propose a three-sector general equilibrium model
of the source country, evaluating supply-side determinants. Liberalization of the agricultural sector spurs population movements, and liberalization of the high-tech sector
deters migration.

Recent studies proposed policy extensions that affect undocumented immigrants’
decisions. Hillman and Weiss (1999) propose a model that considers the possibility
that the median voter allows the immigrants to stay as workers in specific sectors.
Additionally Woodland and Yoshida (2006) extend Ethier’s one country model into
a two-country model. The authors consider two cases of capital mobility and border
and internal enforcement. Another extension included in the model by Woodland and
Yoshida (2006) is the relaxation of the risk neutrality assumption and considers differ-
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ent attitudes towards risk and probability of getting caught. Gaytn-Fregoso and Lahiri
(2000) analyze the effect of foreign aid on undocumented immigration and evaluate the
effect of income repatriation and how the aid may increase immigration.

More recent approaches by Djajic and Michael (2014) consider the effect of cooperation between countries and the effect on immigration. Bandyopadhyay and Pinto (2017)
set up a model that examines centralized and decentralized enforcement of immigration
in a spatial context. The authors find that internal enforcement is over-provided and
border enforcement and local goods under-provided. The authors extend the model to
make the number of unauthorized immigrants endogenous and consider an alternate
spatial structure that separates border and interior regions in the host country.

Another part of the research on undocumented immigrants has focused on measuring the number of undocumented immigrants. This research concentrates mainly on
estimating the number of immigrants using one of two methods: The residual method
and the Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model (Hanson, 2006; Passel,
2007; Passel and Cohn, 2011; Eichler, 2010; Buehn and Eichler, 2013; Warren and
Warren, 2013). These models have created most of the estimates, and they include
variations to increase accuracy. These models have provided estimates for yearly and
monthly observations for the United States as a whole, as well as the individual states.

Empirical research has tried to unravel the determinants of the undocumented migration settlement patterns, including the effects of different state policies. Hanson
and Spilimbergo (1999) examine the effect of changes in Mexican real wages on the
apprehension of undocumented immigrants. They find that the purchasing power of
wages in Mexico is the factor that drives Mexicans to migrate. A large devaluation
of the Mexican peso also increases the number of apprehensions by the border patrol.
Hanson and Spilimbergo (2001) conclude that border enforcement falls following positive shocks to sectors that depend on undocumented labor. Furthermore, they find a
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negative relationship between border enforcement and the lag of changes in the relative
price in apparel, fruits and vegetables, and livestock industries. Their results suggest
that authorities loosen up on border enforcement in certain periods.

Studies on the determinants of undocumented immigrants have used a cross-sections
of states and tested for the effect of different types of policies (Cebula et al., 2013;
Amuedo-Dorantes and Sparber, 2014; Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak, 2014; AmuedoDorantes and Pozo, 2014; Nair-Reichert, 2014; Cebula and Nair-Reichert, 2015; Cebula,
2016a,b). Chiswick (1988), Hanson (2006), and Hanson (2009) analyze the policies regarding undocumented immigrants as the source of low-skilled workers, and analyze
the impact undocumented immigrants have on the economy and highlight certain issues related to the different types of enforcement against undocumented immigration.
Hanson and McIntosh (2007) find evidence of existing networks as a relevant determinant of Mexican migration because the migrants will try to find locations where people
they know reside. A network of friends and known persons is pertinent to the decision of where to live because it eases the job search and housing search (Hanson and
McIntosh, 2007). Cebula et al. (2013) identify determinants of the settlement patterns
of undocumented immigrants within the United States. Their results point towards
states that border the Atlantic Ocean, Pacific Ocean, or the Gulf of Mexico. Cebula
et al. (2013) also find a positive relationship between states with higher median family
income, warmer average January temperatures, higher share of Hispanic population,
and higher values of economic freedom, and a negative relationship with states having
higher cost of living. Nair-Reichert (2014) extends the analysis to consider the real
minimum wage and the share of Gross Domestic Product in different sectors.

Studies related to policies and enforcement have found mixed evidence. Cebula and
Nair-Reichert (2015) explore the effect of policies favorable to access to education an
undocumented immigrants in the State. Cebula et al. (2014) evaluate the attracting
effect of unions for undocumented immigrants and find a negative relationship. This
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negative relationship could be explained by a union-aversion for undocumented immigrants. Amuedo-Dorantes and Sparber (2014) find evidence that state-level policies
to grant in-state tuition for undocumented immigrants are associated with higher tuition and fees, as well as, lower enrollment rates. Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak (2014)
evaluate the effect of E-Verify mandates on the employment, e-verify is a program to
prevent undocumented immigrants from obtaining employment illegally in the United
States, and wages of unauthorized immigrants. They conclude that employment of
undocumented immigrants falls and the hourly wages of native-born male employees
increases. Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2014) analyze the effect of policies that increase
enforcement, such as Operation Streamline (an example of border enforcement by the
federal government) and state-level omnibus immigration laws (policies of interior enforcement by state governments). They find mixed evidence of the efficiency of the
policies.

Cebula (2016b) used a panel data model to evaluate the impact of economic freedom on the settlement patterns of undocumented immigrants. The study also uses
other measures of quality of life. They also consider cost of living and the expectations
of costs. While high income might attract immigrants, the high costs will deter their
migration(Cebula, 2016a,b). Cebula (2016a) finds a positive relationship between the
presence of sanctuary cities and the location choice of undocumented immigrants.

3.2

Data description

This empirical study has three main data sources. Data on undocumented immigration come from estimates by Warren and Warren (2013). These data are estimated
using the residual method, and the population by state from the CENSUS. Data on
legal migration are published by the United States Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). Data on state economic conditions are published by the Bureau of Economic
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Analysis(BEA). Data on sanctuary cities are created from the information published
by the Ohio Jobs & Justice PAC (2017). I set up a data panel by state for the United
States from 2005 to 2010. This panel has yearly observations and the panel includes
all continental states, excludes the District of Columbia.

The dependent variable is the share of undocumented population, it is measured
by percentage of population that is considered undocumented immigrants. The calculation used is equation (3.1). Estimating the number of undocumented immigrants
has been a big research hurdle, because it is not something that can be measured
directly. As explained in the previous section, there are two main methods used to
estimate the number of unauthorized immigrants. The Multiple Indicators Multiple
Causes model (MIMIC) estimates the number of unauthorized immigrants as a latent
variable (Eichler, 2010; Buehn and Eichler, 2013). The problem of using this method
is that you normally use variables related to the latent variable to estimate it and then
you cannot use the same variables to estimate econometric models. The other method
is the residual method. This method uses the estimates of immigrant population or
population born in any country other than the United States and subtracts the total
number of legal immigrants in the state (Hanson, 2006; Passel, 2007; Passel and Cohn,
2011; Warren and Warren, 2013). This methodology set up by Passel (2007) uses estimates of foreign population (S) from the Bureau of the Census and then subtracts the
number of total allowed immigrants (L) that is registered by year from the Department
of Homeland Security. The result from the equation is the undocumented immigrants
(U ndoc) used in equation (3.2).

undocrate =

U ndoct,i
P opulationt,i

U ndoc = S − L

(3.1)

(3.2)
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Recently Warren and Warren (2013) developed an extension of the residual method
used by Passel (2007). The estimation method proposed by Warren and Warren (2013)
provides a solution to all the issues in the residual method defined by Hanson (2006).
Their method extends the residual method to adjust and control by Emigration (Emig),
Removal by the DHS (REM ), Adjustment to Lawful Status (Adj) or Death(D) (See
equation (3.3)). According to Warren and Warren (2013) their results differ from Passel (2007) in the estimates for States with smaller populations, long term trends, and
estimates derived for arrival and departures. It is the method used in this study because of the accuracy for smaller states.

U ndoc = S − L − (Emig + Rem + Adj + D)

(3.3)

Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics.

Variable
RGDPPC
Ln(RGDPPC)
RWages
Ln(RWages)
PCost
Ln(PCost)
Sanctuary
Dummysanc
PopSanctuary
Ln(PopSanctuary)
Undoc
Population
Undocrate
LImmigt−10
Populationt−10 0
LImmigratet−10

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Max

46,158.850
10.725
127,409,020
13.563
31,567.530
5.774
2.302
0.420
1,059,259
2.533
244,371
6,249,193
0.026
15,526.170
5,663,188
0.174

8,230.845
0.173
147,221,609
1.053
4,220.307
0.129
5.873
0.494
2,413,482
3.020
498,802
6,697,522
0.020
33,278.540
6,003,104
0.150

30,813
10.336
9,335,747
11.521
22,677
5.516
0
0
0
0.000
196
514,157
0.0003
159
485,160
0.021

70,096
11.158
842,860,549
15.959
42,987
6.071
36
1
17,289,843
7.240
3,131,311
37,332,685
0.086
217,753
33,987,977
0.829

The share of undocumented immigrants for year 2010 is presented in Figure 3.1. It
shows concentration of more unauthorized immigrants in the border areas and states
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Figure 3.1: Share of undocumented immigrants in 2010. Source: Warren and Warren
(2013)

with larger cities. It is important to notice the importance gained by some states in
the Midwest, Northwest and East of the United States.

Table 3.1 shows that the mean undocumented population for a state is 244,371 with
a standard deviation of 498,802. The share of undocumented immigration in a state’s
population was 2.6 percent, with a standard deviation of 2 percent.

The control variables used in the analysis are: Real Gross Domestic Product
per Capita (RGDP P C)by state, Real Wages per Capita (RWages) by state, Personal Consumption Expenditures (P Cost), Legal immigrants by state 10 years before (LImmigt−10 ), and the Sanctuary variables. The economic variables of GDPPC,
RWages, and PCost are available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2017).

The sanctuary variables are calculated and used three ways. The first one is a
dummy that takes the value for the state and year of one (1) when there at least one
sanctuary city in the state. The second one takes a value of the number of cities that
have been declared sanctuary city, following the approach by Cebula (2016a). The last
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one measures the population for the declared sanctuary cities. This measurement follows a similar approach as the network possibilities for the undocumented immigrants.
I calculate the natural logarithm for this variable1 . The descriptive statistics for all
variables and their logs when appropriate are included in Table 3.1.

3.3

Estimation strategy

The model to find the determinants of the proportion of the population who are
undocumented migration will include the control variables used in the literature. These
variables include economic variables, such as income and wage attractors and cost variables. Economic variables encourage and discourage immigration for a potential destination. The model also includes variables related to previous migration to account
for possible networks, as well as, Sanctuary variables for the potential destination (see
equation (3.4)). The model is a panel data model that includes observations for the 48
states2 and for the period from 2005 to 2010 (N = 288). The model is:

U ndocratet,i = β0 + βE Economict,i + βL LIM M IGt−10,i
+ βS Sanctuaryit + uit

(3.4)

where U ndocratet,i is the share of population that is undocumented immigrant
in the state i and for the year t. The variables included for economic attractiveness
are RGDP P C and RW ages. PCost is used as a proxy for costs, whileLImmigt−10
is a proxy for a network of previous migrants. The variables used for sanctuary are:
Sanctuary, Dummysanc, Ln(P opSanctuary). Previous literature has highlighted that
there are spatial spillover effects in migration (Lozano-Gracia et al., 2010; LeSage and
Thomas-Agnan, 2015) because the migration flow is affected by the different changes
1
2

When PopSanctuary equals 0, I assign a value of 1 so the natural log is defined.
Continental states excluding District Columbia.
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and attractiveness of neighbors that could be the next step in migration if the migrant
cannot find work quickly. This hypothesis is consistent with the use of a spatial autoregressive model.

The spatial version of the previous data panel model is a spatial panel model. This
model, as explained by Elhorst (2014), “is an extension of the general nesting model
from cross section ... to a panel of N observations for T time periods” (Elhorst, 2014,
p. 37). The model is presented in equations (3.5) and (3.6)

Yt,i = αιN + ρW Yt,i + Xt,i β + W Xt,i θ + ut,i

(3.5)

ut,i = λW ut,i + t,i

(3.6)

To account for spatial and temporal heterogeneity, Elhorst (2014) suggests including intercepts µ and ξ as the effects estimates, just as in a standard panel data model
(Elhorst, 2014). Elhorst (2014) also discusses estimating the spatial panel model with
fixed and random effects, as well as estimating different spatial models. According to
Elhorst (2014) “the Hausman specification test might be used” to define which model
(fixed effects vs random effects) is the most appropriate. Also a Likelihood Ratio test
can be used to identify the model should include fixed and random effects are necessary
as part of better fitted model (Elhorst, 2014).

A very important part of the structure describing the spatial model is the Weight
Matrix (W ). This (W ) matrix is populated by zeroes (0) and ones (1), defines who is a
neighbor to whom, and then they are weighted by the total sum of the row to provide
a standardized weighted value. The ones are assigned to designate neighbors. By construction, this matrix should have only zeros on the diagonal, because you cannot be a
neighbor to yourself. There are different methods for building the W matrix, including
the queen contiguity matrix, which is used for this analysis. According to this method,
neighbor is one who shares either a boundary or a corner (Anselin et al., 2008; LeSage
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and Pace, 2010). Equations 3.7 and 3.8, which incorporate fixed effects in a spatial
panel model, will be used for the analysis.

Yt,i = αιN + ρW Yt,i + Xt,i β + W Xt,i θ + µ + ξT ιN + ut,i

(3.7)

ut,i = λW ut,i + t,i

(3.8)

There are different types of spatial panel models: The Spatial Autoregressive model
(SAR) includes the spatial lag of the dependent variable (ρ 6= 0) and makes the assumption that the lag of the error and vector of independent variables coefficients are
equal to zero (θ = λ = 0), the SAR model is presented in equation (3.9). This model
is consistent with the hypothesis that migrants select states where they can find better
conditions and also have good neighbors to migrate to if needed.

Yt,i = αιN + ρW Yt,i + Xt,i β + µ + ξT ιN + ut,i

(3.9)

The Spatial Error Model (SEM ) includes the spatial lag of the error (λ 6= 0) and
makes the assumption that the lag of the dependent variable and independent variables
coefficients are equal to zero (θ = ρ = 0), the SEM model is presented in equations
(3.10) and (3.11). This model is used mostly if there is missing information that cannot
be captured by other variables and this missing information is spatially autocorrelated.

Yt,i = αιN + Xt,i β + µ + ξT ιN + ut,i

(3.10)

ut,i = λW ut,i + t,i

(3.11)

The SLX Model includes the spatial lag of the independent variables (θ 6= 0) and
makes the assumption that the spatial lags of the dependent variable and independent
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variables coefficients are equal to zero (λ = ρ = 0), the SLX model is presented in
equation (3.12). This model is used mostly if values of explanatory vvariable in one
region can explain the value of dependent variable in neighboring region.

Yt,i = αιN + Xt,i β + W Xt,i θ + µ + ξT ιN + ut,i

(3.12)

Other specifications considered in the literature are the Spatial Autoregressive Autoregressive model (SARAR). The SARAR model includes the spatial lag of the dependent variable and the error (ρ 6= 0 and λ 6= 0), but the coefficients for the spatial
lags of the independent variables is zero (θ = 0). The Spatial Durbin Model (SDM)
includes a spatial lag of the dependent variable and the spatial lag of the independent
variables (ρ 6= 0 and θ 6= 0). The Spatial Error Durbin Model (SDEM) includes the
spatial lag of the error and the spatial lag of the independent variables.

To decide which model best fits the analysis better, you can choose according to
a theoretical hypothesis, e.g. if you consider that there is a specific theory for your
model that justifies the inclusion of one type of model or another. Additionally Anselin
et al. (2008) proposes an extension of the Lagrange Multiplier (LM ) tests proposed by
Anselin et al. (1996) to identify which is the better fitting model. These tests and their
robust versions are used to define which is the better model (Elhorst, 2014). However,
these tests only work for SAR, SEM and SARMA

After the model is selected and estimated the interpretation of the model is key
since there is a non-linearity when the dependent variable is part of the model. LeSage
and Pace (2010) and Elhorst (2014) explain that the results from SAR and SDM models cannot be explained directly because of the endogeneity in the dependent variable
because the independent variables affect the dependent variable, but also since the dependent variable of the neighbors (W Y ), it means that their independent variables will
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also affect the dependent variable. This process is called the global spatial spillover.
LeSage and Pace (2010) proposed a method to estimate the impact of the variables
that interact in the model via the spatial lag of the dependent variable (W Y ). Elhorst
(2014) explains this methodology is extended to panel data models and how different
models require different estimations to observe the effect of the independent variables
on the dependent variable. The impact analysis will measure the impact of the independent variables directly on the unit and indirectly by way of the neighbor. These
impacts are the direct effects, the indirect effects, and total effects. These effects are
explained as the effects of the state on itself (same state), the effect from the others
(other states), and the total effect.

3.4

Results

The analysis is applied to three models, these models differentiate by the way the
Sanctuary variable is measured. The models use each measurement of Sanctuary as
they could be attractors for undocumented immigrants. The dummy variable tests
whether the existence is an attractor or not, the number of cities considers that the
attractors is the number of cities that are declared as sanctuaries and the population
of sanctuary cities divides the effect from the existence into a pseudo network effect
that is related to the population in the sanctuary cities in the state. The analysis will
first choose the type of model that fits the data better between the models discussed
in the previous section.

The test to decide if the spatial panel model should include fixed effects or be pooled
is the Likelihood Ratio (LR) test. The results of the LR test in Table 3.2 show that the
fixed effects should be included in the model. This test compares the Likelihood ratios
of the two models with the fixed effects and the pooled model. The results in table
3.2 show the rejection of the null hypothesis to support evidence that they should be
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included.

Table 3.2: Likelihood Ratio (LR) Test for the spatial panel models.

Model 1
Test
Spatial fixed effects
Time-period fixed effects
Model 2
Test
Spatial fixed effects
Time-period fixed effects
Model 3
Test
Spatial fixed effects
Time-period fixed effects

Statistic
1367.6765
17.6313

DF
48
6

p-value
0.000
0.007

Statistic
1367.2617
18.8377

DF
48
6

p-value
0.000
0.004

Statistic
1375.7194
19.065

DF
48
6

p-value
0.000
0.004

As explained in the previous section Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests are used to
decide which model fits the data better. The results from the LM tests are included in
Table 3.3, the LM tests show that the spatial lag test and spatial error hypothesis is
rejected in both, however the robust versions of the tests only reject the null hypothesis
for the spatial lag model and not for the spatial error in all three models.

The spatial adjusted Hausman test will test the hypothesis if the random effects
model and the fixed effect models are consistent or reject it. Table 3.4 presents results
from the spatial Hausman test. The test rejects the null hypothesis in all three models,
this result point towards using the fixed effects model.

Table 3.5 presents the results from the spatial panel models. The results show
that the coefficient associated to the spatial lag of the dependent variable is positive
and significant. The results are positive and significant for RGDPPC and RWages and
negative but not significant for PCost. The Share of legal immigrants from ten years
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Table 3.3: Lagrange Multiplier Tests (LM) for the specification of the spatial panel
models.

Model1
Test
LM test no spatial lag
robust LM test no spatial
LM test no spatial error
robust LM test no spatial
Model2
Test
LM test no spatial lag
robust LM test no spatial
LM test no spatial error
robust LM test no spatial
Model3
Test
LM test no spatial lag
robust LM test no spatial
LM test no spatial error
robust LM test no spatial

lag
error

lag
error

lag
error

Statistic
86.706
33.622
55.321
2.236

p-value
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.135

Statistic
85.846
34.361
53.400
1.914

p-value
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.167

Statistic
79.186
28.591
53.050
2.455

p-value
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.117

Table 3.4: Hausman Test for the spatial panel models.

Model 1
Model 2
Model 3

Hausman
22.8596
24.1207
27.8265

DF
11
11
11

p-value
0.0185
0.0122
0.0034

before is positive and significant. The LR test and Wald test confirm that the models
should be a SDM and include the lag of the independent variables. The spatial lag of
the independent variable shows positive and significant result for RGPPC and negative
and significant coefficients for Rwages and PCost. The coefficient associated to lag of
the variable LImmigt−10 is negative, but insignificant.

All the sanctuary variables have positive coefficients, however it is significant only
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for the Dummy for the presence of a Sanctuary city and the population in the sanctuary city. This result identifies a preference for larger cities because they have more
immigrants and they have larger labor markets. The result also holds for the spatial
lag of the sanctuary dummy and the population in Sanctuary cities.

Table 3.6 shows the estimates of the direct, indirect and total effects. There is a
positive direct and indirect effect for GDPPC, this result could be explained by the
perspective of migration and having into account future migration or the perception
of states that have good socioeconomic conditions. However, the effect estimates for
RWages are positive direct effect and negative indirect effect. Though this result seems
puzzling, it could be associated with a stonger pull effect by the state that pays the
highest salaries against its neighbors. Additionally, when the state has a neighbor with
a high wage, it will affect negatively the neighbor and attract the immigrants to further
migration. The both effects from PCost are both negative and significant, this variable
is a proxy for cost of living and this variable and the spatial lag are viewed by the
undocumented immigrants as variables that have a deterring effect.

Both effects estimates for LImmigt−10 are positive and significant, this result is
explained by the social network effect and the possible spreading of immigrants to
neighboring states. The effect estimates for the sanctuary variables are positive and
significant for the Dummysanc and the logarithm of the population in sanctuary cities
(Ln(P opSanctuary)), but they are not significant for the number of cities (Sanctuary).
The sanctuary dummy variable approach is significant and positive because it means
that the existence of at least one Sanctuary city makes the state attractive for the
undocumented immigrant population and also the neighboring states. However, this
analysis cannot clearly distinguish between undocumented immigration coming directly
to a state that neighbors one with at least one sanctuary city and the undocumented
immigrant moving to the state with a sanctuary city and then proceeding towards the
neighboring state.
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Table 3.5: Results for the spatial autoregressive panel models with fixed effects of the
Share of undocumented immigrants of all population. The values in parenthesis are
t-statistics.

Variable
Ln(RGDPPC)
Ln(RWages)
Ln(PCost)
LImmigt−10
Dummysanc

Model 1
0.014∗∗∗
(3.113)
0.003∗∗∗
(3.113)
-0.012
(-1.388)
0.067∗∗∗
(12.647)
0.004∗∗∗
(3.769)

Model 2
0.014∗∗∗
(3.169)
0.003∗∗∗
(3.169)
-0.012
(-1.379)
0.067∗∗∗
(12.574)

0.001∗∗∗
(3.884)

Ln(PopSanctuary)
Sanctuary
W*Ln(RGDPPC)
W*Ln(RWages)
W*Ln(PCost)
W*LImmigt−10
W*Dummysanc
W*Ln(PopSanctuary)

0.029∗∗∗
(2.901)
-0.003∗∗∗
(-3.178)
-0.056∗∗∗
(-4.86)
-0.015
(-1.049)
0.006∗∗
(2.263)

0.030∗∗∗
(2.970)
-0.003∗∗∗
(-3.079)
-0.057∗∗∗
(-4.954)
-0.013
(-1.177)

Wald test
p-value
LR test
p-value
Note:

0.000104
(1.144)
0.030∗∗∗
(2.721)
-0.003∗∗
(-2.497)
-0.051∗∗∗
(-4.324)
-0.012
(-1.032)

0.001∗∗
(2.365)

W*Sanctuary
W*dep.var.

Model 3
0.014∗∗∗
(3.066)
0.004∗∗∗
(3.066)
-0.013
(-1.487)
0.067∗∗∗
(12.037)

0.548∗∗∗
0.545∗∗∗
(9.988)
(9.897)
11.21
13.22
0.047
0.021
13.425
12.943
0.02
0.024
∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01

0.000
(1.600)
0.562∗∗∗
(10.336)
11.282
0.046
10.988
0.052
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The natural logarithm of the population in Sanctuary cities makes follows a rationality similar to the presence of social network or what is called the gravity approach.
The gravity approach explains that large populations attract more migrants Greenwood
(1993). The undocumented immigrants perceive that the population in sanctuary cities
as an attractive labor market, because it provide a safe environment and they are able
to blend in.

Table 3.6: Effect estimates for the spatial panel models with fixed effects of the Share
of undocumented immigrants of all population.

Model1
Variable
Ln(RGDPPC)
Ln(RWages)
Ln(PCost)
LImmigt−10
Dummysanc
Model 2
Variable
Ln(RGDPPC)
Ln(RWages)
Ln(PCost)
LImmigt−10
Ln(PopSanctuary)
Model3
Variable
Ln(RGDPPC)
Ln(RWages)
Ln(PCost)
LImmigt−10
Sanctuary
Note:

direct
0.021∗∗∗
0.003∗∗∗
-0.023∗∗∗
0.072∗∗∗
0.006∗∗∗

t-stat
3.579
3.60
-2.746
12.176
4.272

indirect
0.076∗∗∗
-0.003∗
-0.129∗∗∗
0.052∗∗∗
0.017∗∗∗

t-stat
3.183
-1.764
-6.146
2.696
3.116

total
0.097∗∗∗
-0.001
-0.152∗∗∗
0.123∗∗∗
0.023∗∗∗

t-stat
3.449
-0.258
-6.691
5.538
3.618

direct
0.021∗∗∗
0.003∗∗∗
-0.023∗∗∗
0.071∗∗∗
0.001∗∗∗

t-stat
3.759
3.396
-2.658
12.42
4.205

indirect
0.077∗∗∗
-0.003∗
-0.13∗∗∗
0.047∗∗
0.003∗∗∗

t-stat
3.358
-1.741
-6.218
2.461
3.191

total
0.097∗∗∗
-0.001
-0.152∗∗∗
0.118∗∗∗
0.004∗∗∗

t-stat
3.651
-0.309
-6.746
5.327
3.675

direct
0.021∗∗∗
0.004∗∗∗
-0.024∗∗∗
0.072∗∗∗
0.00

t-stat
3.665
5.021
-2.825
11.326
1.434

indirect
0.081∗∗∗
-0.002
-0.124∗∗∗
0.054∗∗∗
0.001

t-stat
total
t-stat
3.146 0.103∗∗∗ 3.404
-0.618
0.002
0.884
-5.826 -0.148∗∗∗ -6.354
2.241 0.126∗∗∗ 4.554
1.747
0.001
1.781
∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01
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3.5

Conclusions

This chapter attempts to test the determinants for the location of undocumented
immigrants. I set up a spatial panel model for the states of the United States for the
period from 2005 to 2010. The results from the model highlight the economic variables
and networks used in previous research. The effect from sanctuary cities is proportional to the population size that lives in the city rather than to the number of cities.
The sanctuary dummy provides a support for the hypothesis that having at least one
sanctuary city is attractive for undocumented immigrants.

The spatial model results support the idea of a possible next step migration in
economic terms, sanctuary, and existing networks. The interaction between the direct
and indirect effects of wages is puzzling because it does not support the high wage
neighbor hypothesis. But it could be explained by the perception based on the GDP
and proxy of availability of work rather than the possibility of receiving a higher wage.
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Chapter 4

Changes in Poverty
Measurements and Forced
Migration: The Case of Colombia
Migration is defined as the movement of population from one place to another.
This change of residence usually occurs in response to a disequilibrium observed between two regions (Sjaastad, 1962; Harris and Todaro, 1970). People usually move to
another place in response to differences in wages or incomes between regions, or some
other factor that affects welfare. However, Colombia has experienced an internal conflict for fifty years. In the 1990s, armed groups forced people to migrate as part of a
strategy to gain dominance over specific territories and control the population located
in them. The displaced population lose most of their belongings when they flee to a
new place in order to survive (Ibáñez and Moya, 2010). The purpose of this chapter
is twofold. First, I decompose the change in poverty in Colombian municipalities for
the period of 1993 to 2005 to understand what improvements happened and where.
Second, I explore whether forced migration created the structural change that affected
measurements of poverty and made them fall, despite the fact that forced displacement
took away all the physical capital that displaced families use to hold (Ibáñez and Moya,
2010).
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The first Millennium Development Goal set in the Millennium Summit of the United
Nations in 2000 is for developing countries to reduce extreme poverty by half. This goal
set by the United Nations highlights the relevance of poverty in developing countries.
This chapter explores how poverty changed, and the components that improved. What
part of this change in the measurement of poverty is related to forced displacement? I
highlight the importance of a thorough comprehension of the poverty changes and their
impact on public policy. To explore the changes, I propose a structural decomposition
of the poverty change using Shift-Share Analysis to evaluate the changes in regions
and dimensions. This also helps identify changes caused by using different measures of
poverty.

Shift-Share Analysis is a tool used in regional science to separate improvements
of employment or value added in different sectors and regions. It emphasizes which
sectors have developed more thoroughly and which are slower, while at the same time
highlighting what locations are making greater changes. Shift-Share Analysis is also
used to analyze structural changes in the composition of labor markets or changes in
the evolution of fertility rates, age composition of migration trends, and population
changes (Bonet-Morón, 1999; Franklin and Plane, 2004; Franklin, 2012; Plane, 1987).
Such analysis focuses on transformations towards new dynamics of development and
change.

This analysis explores changes and improvements in the components of poverty for
municipalities for the period 1993-2005. It is interesting that the municipalities that
improved the most are those municipalities that received more forced displaced population. The municipalities that decreased poverty in Unmet Basic Needs (UBN), but did
not increase the number of non-poor population are those municipalities that pushed
out population. Additionally, due to the cost of poverty reductions, it is cheaper for
institutions to expand access to public services in urban areas. The displaced people
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Chapter 4. Poverty Changes and Forced Migration

55

would gain access to urban amenities, but this does not compensate for the quality of
living that the displaced population lost when they had to leave everything behind.

Previous research related to forced displacement by Sayago-Gómez (2012a) showed
which municipalities received displaced population. According to my decomposition,
these municipalities increased the size of their non-poor population.

Additionally

Sayago-Gómez (2012a) highlights which municipalities pushed out more population
due to conflict. I show that some municipalities did not increase the number of nonpoor population, yet decreased poverty, and others increased the number of non-poor
people at a slower rate, yet decreased poverty. This can happen if a sufficient number
of the poor are pushed out. I estimate a spatial econometric model to test for the
relevance of displacement for change in poverty. The spatial model accounts for spatial
spillovers from the internal conflict on displacement (Sayago-Gómez, 2012a; LozanoGracia et al., 2010) due to the missing information related to the presence of armed
groups and the probabilities of migrating in all directions.

The main findings in this chapter are twofold. First, I highlight which regions developed more and which regions are growing at a slower rate, which regions reduced
poverty, and which components contributed more to poverty reduction. Second, I find
that the poorest areas did not reduce the non-poor population. Third, I show that
forced displacement affected the UBN measurements of poverty, because I find that
the UBN poverty reductions were partly caused by the displacement and access to urban amenities. Fourth, the contrast between UBN and the Multidimensional Poverty
Index (MPI) shows that these municipalities did not decrease in the poor population.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 4.1 discusses recent
studies related to forced displacement, poverty and their possible relationship in the
literature. Section 4.2 examines the empirical methodology. Section 4.3 presents data
and transformations to analyze the information. Section 4.4 provides results of the

Juan Tomás Sayago-Gómez

Chapter 4. Poverty Changes and Forced Migration

56

Shift-Share analysis and Section 4.5 looks at the regression results and the spatial
model. Finally, Section 4.6 concludes the study with some closing remarks.

4.1

Background literature

This literature review is composed of three main issues. The first relates to decomposition applications for poverty and decompositions used in regional science. The
second regards forced migration in Colombia and the research questions that have been
answered and their contributions to the research of this paper. The third topic is the
relationship between poverty and migration.

Poverty decompositions have been used to analyze changes in poverty changes and
understand different effects of these changes. Datt and Ravallion (1992) proposed a
method to separate the change in poverty into distribution-neutral growth and redistribution effects. While Huppi and Ravallion (1991) suggested a method to decompose changes over time into intra-sectoral effects and population shifts. Azevedo
et al. (2013a) and Azevedo et al. (2013b) proposed decomposition of poverty and inequality changes. The decomposition of poverty of Colombian data was proposed by
Pérez Pérez et al. (2015), who decompose the Multidimentional Poverty Index (MPI)
into its dimensions to explore the changes between national measures and determine
which dimensions are the bigger weaknesses in Colombian Poverty. However, the Multidimensional Poverty Index has only been estimated using the information from the
2005 Census.

The proposed method to decompose poverty has been used in regional science for
many years to separate changes in employment and value added. Regional Science
research uses Shift-Share Analysis to separate competitive and regional effects (Selting
et al., 1992; Loveridge and Selting, 1998; Capello, 2007; Jackson and Haynes, 2009).
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And it has been used widely to analyze growth changes in states and regions of the
United States (Selting et al., 1992; Loveridge and Selting, 1998). Additionally Nazara
and Hewings (2004) proposed extensions to highlight different changes and other specifications of analytical regional conceptions, more explicitly the regional change in comparison to the region’s neighbors.

This analysis has been extended to study changes in the population structure such
as Plane (1987); Franklin and Plane (2004); Franklin (2012). Their analysis aimed to
identify the pattern of variation and the groups that stray from the previous structure.
Shift-Share has been applied to Colombian data to identify changes in value added that
define the economic structure in the different regions (Bonet-Morón, 1999).

Research related to forced migration in Colombia has focused on the identification
of the characteristics of migrants, the expulsion process, the consequences for quality
of life, the destination choice, and the policies instituted by the government (Ibáñez,
2008). The article by Ibáñez and Moya (2010) addresses the economic consequences of
displacement and how displaced population remain in poverty after the displacement
process and the low rates of economic retrieval of their capital after displacement. The
book by Ibáñez (2008) includes a thorough compilation of articles that address most
of the issues related to forced displacement. The only article that addresses the consequences of the internal conflict on the economic and political institutions is the study
by Cardenas et al. (2016). Cardenas et al. (2016) find a negative effect from internal
conflict on the state capacity (or institutional strength) in Colombian municipalities.

Furthermore, previous research pointed out that displaced people are part of a
spatial process (Lozano-Gracia et al., 2010; Sayago-Gómez, 2012a). The paper by
Lozano-Gracia et al. (2010) set up a gravity model that included the spatial lag of
the dependent variable. Their model highlights the importance of spatial contiguous
neighbors in the moving decisions. Sayago-Gómez (2012a) also set up a spatial model
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to account for the conflict effect on expulsion or departure of forced migrants. This
model also identified the existence of an area of influence of armed groups. It is measured using spatially lagged variables.

The migration literature has explained migration as the result of an economic or
social imbalance between conditions in different places, such as rural and urban areas.
The theoretical arguments that explain motives to migrate are based on differences
between places, expectations of higher incomes, and expected utility. The basic models
have been explained by Sjaastad (1962) and Harris and Todaro (1970). These models have been extended to consider other relevant elements (Brueckner and Zenou,
1999; Atuesta, 2012). They have been tested empirically as summarized by Greenwood
(1993) and Lucas (1993). Migration research has considered the differences in income
and other relevant amenities to pull people to migrate, but also models such as the
gravity model that explain the migration process as part of an equilibrium between
regions (Lowry, 1966; Greenwood, 1993; Greenwood and Hunt, 2003).

The motives to migrate in the theoretical models proposed by Sjaastad (1962) and
Harris and Todaro (1970) are the expected economic gains from moving from one region
to another or from rural to urban areas. These approaches aim to explain the factors
that push and pull migrants (Dorigo and Tobler, 1983). They also move towards the
development of the gravity model that considers variables that push population and
attract population as the distance and population size are the main determinants of
migration (Lowry, 1966; Greenwood, 1975, 1985, 1993; Greenwood and Hunt, 2003).
As Greenwood and Hunt (2003) argued, the gravity model considers spatial interactions between population and distance. Cushing (1986) emphasizes the specification
of distance and space affects the model and results. Greenwood et al. (1991) consider
regional amenities, regional wages, and price variables. Additionally new methods and
interpretations of migration coefficients are being considered for research, along with
new methodologies that consider spatial structure (Cushing and Poot, 2003; Cushing,
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2005a,b; LeSage and Pace, 2008; LeSage and Thomas-Agnan, 2015).

The migration research that has focused mainly on the consequences of migration,
is the research that considers the remittances and their effects on developing economies.
Previous research found a positive effect of remittance to reduce poverty in different
countries of Africa and South America (Adams and Page, 2005; Gupta et al., 2009;
Acosta et al., 2008; Adams et al., 2008). Moreover there is mixed evidence that suggests a positive effect from remittances on inequality (Stark et al., 1988) and there are
different explanations to the theoretical considerations (Stark et al., 1986; Stark and
Lucas, 1988). Additionally the research has found a positive effect of remittances on
economic growth (Pradhan et al., 2008; Adams et al., 2008).

Our emphasis is on the effects of forced migration on how migration creates an
imbalance in economic conditions, and how forced migrants affect the social and economic structure. Recent studies have considered the effects of migration on economic
variables, but this research relates mostly to remittances, and how they affect the
conditions in developing countries.

4.2

Data description

The data for this chapter come from four different sources: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadisticas (National Department of Statistics – DANE),
Departamento Nacional de Planeación (National Department of Planning – DNP), Departamento Administrativo para la Prosperidad Social ( Administrative Department of
Social Prosperity – DPS), and Ramirez, Bedoya and Dı́az (Ramı́rez et al., 2016). The
poverty measurements (dependent variables) and controls come from DANE, DNP and
Ramı́rez et al. (2016), and the variables related to displacement come from the DPS.
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show the description of the variables used in this chapter and their
summary statistics.

Variable

Description

Year

DANE
DANE
DANE
DANE
DANE
DANE
DANE
DANE
DANE
DANE
DANE
DANE
Ramı́rez et al. (2016)
Ramı́rez et al. (2016)

2005
1993
2005
1993
2005
1993
2005
1993
2005
1993
2005
1993
2005
1993

DANE
DANE
DNP
DANE
DANE

2005
1993
1993-2004
2005
1993
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Dependent Variables
UBNpovpct05
Percentage of Population in Poverty by Unmet Basic Needs
UBNpovpct93
Percentage of Population in Poverty by Unmet Basic Needs
UBNvivpct05
Percentage of Population in Poverty by Housing Characteristics
UBNvivpct93
Percentage of Population in Poverty by Housing Characteristics
UBNserpct05
Percentage of Population in Poverty by Access to Public Services
UBNserpct93
Percentage of Population in Poverty by Access to Public Services
UBNhacpct05
Percentage of Population in Poverty by Housing Overcrowding
UBNhacpct93
Percentage of Population in Poverty by Housing Overcrowding
UBNinapct05
Percentage of Population in Poverty by Access to Education
UBNinapct93
Percentage of Population in Poverty by Access to Education
UBNdeppct05
Percentage of Population in Poverty by Economic Dependence
UBNdeppct93
Percentage of Population in Poverty by Economic Dependence
IPM2005
Percentage of Population in Poverty by Multidimentional Poverty Index
IPM1993
Percentage of Population in Poverty by Multidimentional Poverty Index
Independent Variables
Displaced1997−2004 Displaced Out Population
Arrival1997−2004
Arrival of Displaced Population
Total sgp
Government Investment Values in Millions of Pesos
Density05
Density of population
Density93
Density of population

Source
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics

Variable
pop2005
pop93
UBNpovpct93
UBNvivpct93
UBNserpct93
UBNhacpct93
UBNinapct93
UBNdeppct93
UBNpovpct05
UBNvivpct05
UBNserpct05
UBNhacpct05
UBNinapct05
UBNdeppct05
Displaced1997−2004
Arrival1997−2004
IPM2005
IPM1993
TOTAL.SGP
IntExpulsion
IntArrival
Total sgp pc
Density93
Density05

4.2.1

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Max

41,124.780
31,561.940
0.493
0.835
0.822
0.799
0.876
0.798
0.578
0.823
0.884
0.855
0.956
0.815
1,504.703
1,601.346
0.758
0.987
42,862,777
0.111
0.001
7.345
115.022
149.160

245,165.000
178,751.300
0.179
0.172
0.166
0.107
0.068
0.073
0.183
0.166
0.143
0.083
0.036
0.081
3,790.443
6,391.538
0.146
0.010
245,399,025
0.447
0.004
0.502
475.933
652.280

885
114
0.001
0.097
0.003
0.222
0.549
0.517
0.028
0.134
0.051
0.188
0.614
0.315
0
0
0.245
0.889
5,001,287
0.000
0.000
5.943
0.055
0.690

6,840,116
4,922,825
0.908
0.996
1.000
0.972
1.000
0.968
0.946
1.000
1.000
0.987
1.000
0.984
52,006
102,818
0.999
1.000
7,248,232,836
10.912
0.063
9.306
10561.000
13821.940

Dependent variables

The dependent variables are the estimates of the changes in poverty in Colombian
municipalities for the period from 1993 to 2005. These changes in poverty are the
differences in percentage between time periods. However, there are different ways to
measure poverty in Colombia. The different methods try to consider whether or not
the living conditions are appropriate. The different methodologies to measure poverty
use different variables to account for the relevant characteristics of the condition. Some
of these variables overlap between methodologies.
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There are two main classes of methods to measure poverty: the methods that
measure poverty in monetary terms and the methods that measure poverty based on
non-monetary terms. Monetary estimates of poverty depend on income levels for households: Thus a family is poor when their income is below a certain value. The poverty
estimates based on non-monetary terms usually try to answer the question: Do people
live in acceptable living conditions? (Feres and Mancero, 2001). The non-monetary
approach seeks to evaluate whether households have met their basic needs. The households are surveyed to evaluate if they have access to goods and public services to
satisfy these needs (Feres and Mancero, 2001). The poverty measurements used in this
paper come from two methodologies: The Unmet Basic Needs (UBN) and the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI). These variables are chosen because they estimate
the percentage of the population that is considered to be poor (Feres and Mancero,
2001; Angulo et al., 2016; Ramı́rez et al., 2016). I use the estimates from these two
methodologies to estimate the changes in poverty between census periods.

The UBN index classifies as poor the percentage of the total population that does
not meet at least one or more of five basic needs. The UBN includes housing characteristics, access to sanitary services, housing conditions, access to education, and
economic capacity. Poverty is evaluated for each component and when a household
shows a lack in one of the components, it is considered to be poor. If it shows an
absence of two or more components, the household is considered to be extremely poor
(Feres and Mancero, 2001).

The components of the UBN include information on

• House characteristics that measure the quality of shelter, for example, the material used in walls, roof, and floor.
• Access to sanitary services measured by the availability of the household of a

Juan Tomás Sayago-Gómez
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water source and the system for elimination of human wastes.
• Housing conditions crowding, such as, the ratio of the size of the house to the
number of people living there; three or more people per room is considered overcrowding.
• Access to education measured by school attendance of children aged 7 to 11.
• Economic capacity measured by the number of dependent persons per working
person in the household.
The percentage of the population who are poor decreased according to UBN methodology in Colombian municipalities between 1993 to 2005. The poverty reductions are
not the same for all components nor all areas. Table 4.3 shows the reductions in the
different components and poverty measurements and Figure 4.1 shows which municipalities decreased their poverty rates.

Table 4.3: Percentage of population with Unmet Basic Needs Total and by Component.
Author’s Calculation

Component
House Characteristics
Access to sanitary
Services
Housing conditions
Access to education
Economic capacity
Poverty
Extreme poverty

1993
11.6%
10.5%

2005
10.4%
7.4%

15.4%
8.0%
12.8%
35.8%
14.9%

11.1%
3.6%
11.2%
27.7%
10.6%
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Figure 4.1: Poverty measured by Unsatistied Basic Needs (UBN)
(a) Map of Poverty measured by Unsatisfied Basic Needs on
1993

(b) Map of Poverty measured by Unsatisfied Basic Needs on
2005
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The Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) was developed for Colombia by the National Department of Planning based on the index by the Oxford Poverty and Human
Development Initiative (OPHI) (Alkire and Foster, 2011a,b). This index composed
of five dimensions, all of which have the same relevance and are valued equally, each
dimension formed by different variables, each variable has equal weight inside each dimension (Angulo et al., 2011, 2013, 2016; Ramı́rez et al., 2016).

The components in the MPI includes information on

• Household education condition.
• Childhood and youth conditions.
• Employment.
• Health.
• Access to public utilities and housing conditions.
The dimensions, variables, and weights associated with each variable are in Table
4.4. The MPI is a more complex and more thorough evaluation of poverty, and it was
created to measure poverty and to overcome the problems and limitations that existing
methodologies had. It produces an estimate of poverty, it does not separate results by
components. Figure 4.2 shows the percentage of poor population by municipality in
Colombia measured using the MPI.

The change is calculated as the difference between the percentage of non-poor population in municipalities in 1993 and 2005 (See equation (4.1)). One drawback from
this estimate is that this measure will not change much when the municipality has
already reached high levels. However, it is very sensitive to changes in municipalities
with small percentages of non-poor population, which is a key indicator of the bigger
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Table 4.4: Multidimensional Poverty Index by dimensions and variables. Source: Angulo et al. (2013)

Dimension
Household
education
conditions (0.2)
Childhood and
youth conditions
(0.2)
Employment
(0.2)
Health (0.2)
Access to public
utilities and
housing
conditions (0.2)

Variables
Educational achievement (0.1)
Literacy (0.1)
School attendance (0.05)
No school lag (0.05)
Access to childcare services (0.05)
Children not working (0.05)
No one in long-term unemployment (0.1)
Formal employment (0.1)
Health insurance (0.1)
Access to health services (0.1)
Access to water source (0.04)
Adequate elimination of sewer waste (0.04)
Adequate floors (0.04)
Adequate external walls (0.04)
No critical overcrowding (0.04)

problem of measurements such as the UBN. My interest is the change in poverty, coefficients with positive values decreasing poverty and coefficients with negative values
increasing poverty. Figure 4.3 shows the change in UBN by component in the Colombian municipalities.

∆N on P oori,t = P ct non P oori,t − P ct non P oori,t−1

4.2.2

(4.1)

Independent variables

The independent variables used in this paper include variables related to government investment, the concentration of population and the proportion of urban population. Government investment data come from the National Department of Planning
(DNP). The variables related to population come from the DANE.

These variables will account for government investment to decrease poverty. The
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central government issued regulations related to required percentages of total investment that should help reduce poverty in the municipalities, some by construction of
new infrastructure and others by improving the current infrastructure to provide sustainability. This distribution is part of the General System of Contributions (SGP).
This system gives importance to the policy of social reactivation. Social Reactivation
aims to achieve poverty reduction and it uses “seven tools of equity”: “(i) an education
revolution; (ii) social protection and social security; (iii) economic development for the
benefit of all; (iv) social management of the countryside; (v) social management of
public services; (vi) a country of owners; and (vii) quality of urban life. These matters
are discussed later in this report” (UN Committee on Economic and , CESCR, p. 23).
According to SGP the investments aiming at social reactivation should be around 60
percent of investment resources in afiscal year.

The variables that relate to urban population and population density aim to account for the costs of construction of infrastructure, since Colombia has a large rural
area (Machado, 2011; Sayago-Gómez, 2012b). The costs of building an infrastructure
to reduce poverty in rural municipalities is higher than in urban municipalities. Additionally, another variable that could account for costs of construction of infrastructure
is the density of population. Municipalities that are densely populated will face lower
cost of investment because the population is concentrated in smaller spaces.

The DPS publishes data related to displacement: the expulsions and arrival of
forced migrants in Colombia. This information is reported from 1997 to 2016 for every
municipality. Migrant information is recorded by migrant ID, which allows DPS to
follow migrants for additional moves. Forced migrants from an earlier time are also
allowed to register and can possibly receive benefits if they meet the requirements. I
standardize the number of migrants using the intensity of expulsion and intensity of
arrival. These measures are similar to the ones used by Sayago-Gómez (2012a).
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The intensity of expulsion is the estimate of the share of migrants pushed out divided by the total population in the municipality. Therefore it is the population forced
to migrate out (F orcedouti ) divided by the population (P opi ) in the municipality that
they leave. This estimate is the share of population that migrated out (equation (4.2)).

The intensity of arrival is a measure of share of population displaced to a municipality (M igraini ) divided by the population in the receiving municipality(P opRec), it
measures the share of migrants that arrived to a specific city over all population in the
city where they arrived. Therefore equation (4.3) uses the population that migrated to
a specific municipality divided by the population (P opi ) in the receiving municipality1 .
Figure 4.4 shows the map of the estimates of Intensity of Expulsion and Arrival by
municipality in Colombia.

F orcedouti
P opi

(4.2)

M igraini
M igraini
=
P opRec
P opi

(4.3)

Int Expi =

Int Arri =

1

I estimated another intensity of arrival. It uses the population that migrated to a specific
municipality divided by the population that migrated.
M igraini
Int Arri = PI
i=1 M igraini
The results for the analysis highlight the effect of expulsion but hides the effect of arrival in municipalities where the population that arrives is a significant share of the total population of the municipality.
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Figure 4.2: Poverty measured by Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI)
(a) Map of Poverty measured by Multidimensional Poverty
Index on 1993

(b) Map of Poverty measured by Multidimensional Poverty
Index on 2005
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Figure 4.3: Change in the UBN in the municipalities

(a) Economic dependence

(b) Housing Conditions

(c) School attendance

(d) Public services

(e) House characteristics
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Figure 4.4: Forced Displacement
(a) Intensity of Expulsion

(b) Intensity of Arrival
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An application of Shift-Share analysis to poverty

In order to evaluate the difference in the poverty reductions and the population
movements, I estimate a Shift-Share decomposition to highlight the effect of changes
in the number of non-poor population instead of using and focusing on the proportion
of population that is poor. This analysis relies on the estimates of poor and non-poor
population, and it estimates the change in non-poor population for the two periods of
analysis.

Shift-Share Analysis is used mostly to analyze changes in employment and value
added. It is a tool used to design regional policy and identify the sectors that lead
growth and those that are lagging. Recent applications have focused on population
changes to identify what regions and population groups experienced higher growth
rates compared with other groups and the nation. Additionally the method allows
the identification of regions that undergo declines in population. This analysis helps
distinguish changes in composition of population because it considers racial and ethnic
growth rates (Franklin, 2012). The following application follows a strategy similar to
the application developed by Franklin and Plane (2004) and Franklin (2012).

4.3.1

Shift-Share decompositions

Shift-Share is a method used in Regional Science since the 1960s to decompose
regional employment and value added growth (Loveridge and Selting, 1998; Capello,
2007; Jackson and Haynes, 2009). Traditionally Shift-Share decomposes regional change
into: (1) the national growth effect, (2) the industry mix effect, and (3) the competitive
effect. The classic Shift-Share model is presented in equation (4.4); it shows how
rearranging the growth rates will provide a decomposition from the additive cases.

∆ei,t = (G + (Gi − G) + (gi − Gi ))ei,t−1

(4.4)
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where

• ei,t is the employment at time t in the ith sector
• ∆ei,t is the growth rate of employment from time t − 1 to t in the ith sector
• G is the National Growth rate. Also called the National Effect.
• (Gi − G) is the difference between national growth rates for sector i and all the
sectors. It is also called the Industry Mix Effect.
• (gi − Gi )ei is the difference between the growth rates for sector i for the region
and the country. It is also called the Competitive Effect.
The previous Shift-Share equation can be rearranged for simplicity to only include
growth rates:

gi = (G + (Gi − G) + (gi − Gi ))

(4.5)

The National effect (G) is the amount the region would have changed had it changed
at the same rate as the national economy2 . The industry mix shows how the region
would have changed had its industry mix matched that of the nation, assuming each
sector has uniform growth within nation. In equation (4.4), it involves the difference
between the country’s growth rate of the sector i with respect to the country (Gi − G).
The Competitive Effect captures how growth in the region’s sectors differ from the
national average (gi − Gi ).

Shift-Share is widely used in regional analysis because it is a simple procedure
that uncovers dynamic transformations in sectors and only requires modest amounts
2

Loveridge and Selting (1998), and Jackson and Haynes (2009) explained that this identity says that
the growth rate for the industries in the region should be similar to the growth rate for the national
industry
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of data (Stevens and Moore, 1980; Nazara and Hewings, 2004). Many improvements
to Shift-Share were developed to correct potential issues. These transformations can
help capture other effects in regional changes (Esteban-Marquillas, 1972; Nazara and
Hewings, 2004). Additionally Nazara and Hewings (2004) have proposed to include
the spatial structure or neighboring relations in the Shift-Share analysis to account
for spatial interactions and compositions of neighbors3 . Applications of Shift-Share
analysis have also focused on changes in other variables. Franklin and Plane (2004)
apply Shift-Share to fertility rates in Italy to explain population change trends, Plane
(1987) and Plane (1992) used it to explain migration trends. Franklin (2012) applied it
to population changes. Shift-Share analysis shows the linkages between local, regional
and national trends.

These decompositions allow us to highlight which regions have improved more than
others and reveals the sectors responsible for the improvements. It will also show which
regions are lagging and in which components. I use Shift-Share to evaluate changes in
poverty between different municipalities. It will allow me to distinguish between those
municipalities that really improved and those that improved their UBN but did not
reduce the number of poor.

4.3.2

Data requirement for the Shift-Share analysis to poverty

Data for the Shift-Share come from the Census in years 1993 and 2005 and show the
percentage of population classified as poor according to the UBN methodology and by
each component for each municipality4 . The percentage UBN is presented in Figures
4.1a and 4.1b. We calculate the population that is not classified in UBN to measure
the improvement in population that is not poor and use these estimates to decompose
3

Nazara and Hewings (2004) proposed to include the observations of the neighbors to account for
the industry mix and competitive effect compared to the neighboring areas.
4
The municipality is the decentralized subdivision of Colombia. They form departments which are
equivalent to the states in the United States. Each municipality has its own mayor elected by popular
vote, and one municipality in each department is the capital.
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.

The Shift-Share analysis of poverty will analyze the changes in population classified
as not poor. The different sectors will be the different components in the different departments. The classical Shift-Share in equation (4.6) includes the growth of not poor
population in the country (G) and the growth of not poor population in the country by
the i component (Gi ). The growth rate of the not poor population in each department
by the i component (gi ). The estimated effects are the national(G), national-regional
component change (Gi − G) and the trend differential in the region (gi − Gi ) (Franklin,
2012).

gi = G + (Gi − G) + (gi − Gi )

4.3.3

(4.6)

Results of the Shift-Share analysis

The results from the Shift-Share analysis show that, for all components, the national regional component change is negative, which means that all the components
have lower growth than the total poverty (see Table 4.5). This result can be understood that improvement in all components together is higher than the improvement
from a specific component because all sectoral improvements were partially outgrown
by the total.

The Competitive Effect in the change of non-poor population by municipality and
Table 4.5: Shift-Share decomposition of poverty - National regional Component change

Component
Change

House
Characteristics
−0.1302%

Housing
Conditions
−0.0892%

Access to
Sanitary services
−0.1063%

Economic
Capacity
−0.1277%

Access to
Education
−0.0928%
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component is presented in Figure 4.5. It is easier to present the result of the Shift-Share
methodology in a map because we have results for 1008 municipalities. The results show
concentrations of greater change for all the components in the most populated departments.5 Antioquia, Atlantico, Bogotá, Cauca, Cundinamarca, Nariño, and Valle del
Cauca. Another group of faster growth is the oil producing departments Arauca and
Casanare. These departments receive royalties to invest in poverty reductions. However the increase in non-poor population could be the result of migration to work in
areas related to oil production. The municipalities that show a low or negative trend in
most of the components are Choco, Norte de Santander, Caldas, Boyaca, Magdalena,
Risaralda, and Tolima. In these departments the changes are mainly low or negative.

We can notice in Figure 4.5 that some of the municipalities show similar improvement in all components which could be related to economic immigration for employment. However employment information is not available for Colombian municipalities.
I highlight that the change observed in Figure 4.3 and the change observed in Figure
4.5 show certain similarities and differences. These differences can be traced to changes
observed in Figure 4.4, because the municipalities that improved in Figure 4.5 receive
a large group of displaced population.

4.4

Empirical strategy

Reduction of poverty is one of the most important goals of economic policy in developing countries. To evaluate if displacement caused the decline in poverty measured
by UBN, I set up a model where I assess the sources of the changes in poverty in
Colombian municipalities. This model includes variables that should affect positively
and negatively the change in poverty. One of the variables is the investments made
by the government because each municipality receives funds for inversions to improve
5

The department is the administrative unit comparable to a State.
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living conditions. Another relevant variable is the density of population because it is
related to the population that could live in these municipalities. Furthermore, those
municipalities with a higher concentration of population face significantly lower costs
to provide access to utilities.

Since the main hypothesis of this paper relies on the measurement of the effect of
displacement on poverty in Colombia, I set up this model to test the effect of forced
migration on changes in poverty in Colombian municipalities. The displacement of the
population in Colombia affects the measurements of poverty through its effect on the
distribution of the poor population.

The econometric model is defined in equation (4.7),

∆N on P oori,t = β0 + β1 Arri + β2 Expi
+ βXi + ui

(4.7)

where our variable (∆P ovi ) measures the change in poverty from 1993 to 2005. The
variables Arrival (Arri ) and Expulsion (Expi ) are the variables that quantify the forced
displacement in the different municipalities. The variables included in X are other controls related to changes in poverty, such as investments, or population density.

The displacement variables, as previously defined by Sayago-Gómez (2012a), are
the intensity of expulsion and intensity of arrival. These variables are standardized to
consider the effect of the population at a point of origin as a standardizing variable for
expulsion. The total number of the displaced population arriving is the denominator
for the intensity of arrival. The intensity of arrival is standardized differently to avoid
bias in the result when large cities receive displaced population.

We follow the methodology set up by Arbia (2014), Elhorst (2010), and Elhorst
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(2014) to estimate the appropriate model that measures the changes in poverty in the
Colombian municipalities. According to this strategy, there are seven models that could
potentially fit the data: (1) Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), (2) Spatial Autoregressive
Model (SAR), (3) Spatial Error Model (SEM), (4) Spatial Lag of X (independent variables) Model (SLX), (5) Spatial Durbin Model (SDM), (6) Spatial Durbin Error Model
(SDEM), or (7) Spatial Autoregressive with additional Autoregressive error structure
(SARAR also denominated SAC by LeSage and Pace (2010)). This testing procedure
points towards the existence of spatial dependence in the data. Furthermore, the procedure will suggest which model is the most appropriate to fit the data.

y = Xβ1 + λW y + W Xβ2 + u

(4.8)

u = ρW u + ε

(4.9)

where the y is an n × 1 vector of cross-sectional observations, also known as the dependent variable. X is an n × m matrix of independent variables that affect the dependent
variable. β1 and β2 are two m × 1 vectors of coefficients associated with the independent variables and neighbors average of the independent variables. All these models
assume the existence of a W matrix or weight matrix. This W matrix is an n × n
matrix that defines neighbor relations. The parameters ρ and λ are scalar parameters
that represent the spatial relationship associated with the error term and dependent
variable y.

The equations that define the seven models are considered by setting parameters
equal to zero in equations (4.8) and (4.9) (Elhorst, 2010, 2014; Arbia, 2014). The models are:

1. The OLS model is the aspatial model, and it assumes that β2 = 0, λ = 0, and
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ρ = 0.
2. The SAR model includes a spatial dependence on the y variable. The dependent
variable of a unit interacts with its neighbor: β2 = 0, ρ = 0, and λ 6= 0.
3. The SEM includes a spatial interaction between the error terms, and it is consistent with a model where the omitted determinants, are spatially autocorrelated:
β2 = 0, λ = 0 , and ρ 6= 0.
4. The SLX model includes exogenous interaction effects, where the neighbor’s independent variables affect the dependent variable: λ = 0, ρ = 0, and β2 6= 0.

5. SDM includes spatial dependence on the dependent variables and the neighbors’
independent variables: ρ = 0, β2 6= 0, and λ 6= 0.
6. SDEM includes spatial interaction between error terms and the neighbor’s independent variables: λ = 0, β2 6= 0, and ρ 6= 0.
7. The SARAR model includes the spatial dependence on the dependent variables
and the spatial interaction between the error terms: β2 = 0 and λ 6= 0, and ρ 6= 0.

To select which model will fit the data generating process most accurately, we follow
the methodology set up by Arbia (2014), Elhorst (2010), and Elhorst (2014). First, we
run the OLS model with all the variables, also considering the model with fixed effects.
Afterward, we estimate the Lagrange multiplier tests (LM) to evaluate the existence of
spatial dependence in the error term of the dependent variable (Anselin et al., 1996).
The robust versions of the tests consider the presence of the other forms of spatial
dependence (Anselin et al., 1996).

The results from the specification tests and our theoretical considerations of what
observed relations contribute to the studied phenomena will point us towards the most
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appropriate model. However, we should consider the arguments in previous literature
to portray which spatial model was relevant to the problem at hand. Sayago-Gómez
(2012a) suggested the SEM and SDEM as appropriate models to represent the spatial dependence existing in forced displacement and the presence of armed groups in
the municipalities of Colombia. Ramı́rez et al. (2016) estimate a SAR model for the
percentage of the poor population in Colombian municipalities. Their approach is different from ours because they estimate a model that has the level or share of the poor
population as their dependent variable while this analysis focuses on the change.

As stated previously, both forced displacement and poverty have a spatial component (Lozano-Gracia et al., 2010; Sayago-Gómez, 2012a; Ramı́rez et al., 2016). The
spatial component of forced displacement has been explained by Sayago-Gómez (2012a)
as armed groups have larger areas of impact. They do not stay in one place, but move
around regions since they move mostly by walking, and they can go around in any direction in the regions. These areas of impact provide a local effect on the neighboring
municipalities. The spatial local effect is similar to the spatial effect associated with
the Spatial Durbin Error Model according to the theoretical approach by LeSage (2014).

4.5

Results from immigration and poverty

The regression results shows the effect of displacement on poverty in Colombian municipalities. It will be presented according to the measurement and poverty dimension
or characteristic. We first analyze the change in total poverty from the UBN methodology. Then we explore the changes in the different components or dimensions. The
final analysis examines the change using the MPI methodology and the estimates from
Ramı́rez et al. (2016). The comparison will show which measures of poverty change
are affected by the population movements.
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The testing procedure results for the model that analyzes the change in total poverty
are in Table 4.6. The results of the LM test reject the null hypothesis, supporting both
of the Spatial lag model and Spatial Error Model. The Robust LM test reject only for
the spatial lag model. This result points toward the spatial lag model. However, as
already pointed by Sayago-Gómez (2012a) the spatial component related to expulsion
in Colombia tends to follow a model that has missing spatially independent variables.
Thus the robust test results contradict the theoretically preferred hypothesis, I will
follow the theoretical assumptions for the model and use the Spatial Error Model.

Table 4.6: Lagrange Multiplier Test for Total Poverty Regressions

Test

Statistics

df

p-value

LMerr
LMlag
RLMerr
RLMlag
SARMA

86.050
90.836
1.547
6.334
92.384

1
1
1
1
2

0.000
0.000
0.214
0.012
0.000

The testing procedure applied for the following analysis of poverty focuses on the
poverty changes by component: the test for housing characteristics in Table 4.7, the
test for access to utilities in Table 4.8, housing conditions in Table 4.9, access to education in Table 4.10, and economic capacity in Table 4.11. The results from these tests
are similar to the ones for total poverty measured by UBN. These results reject the
null hypothesis that allows consideration of the spatial model. It is noticeable how the
robust test procedures highlight the SAR model as the more appropriate, however, as
stated in the last paragraph, theory advocates for the use of the SEM and SDEM.

The Lagrange multiplier tests for the model using the MPI are included in Table
4.12. These tests reject the null hypothesis in favor of the spatial model and the robust
tests are rejected for both models and the statistic is higher for the spatial error. This
result supports the SEM and SDEM as selected to better fit the data.
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Table 4.7: Lagrange Multiplier Test for Housing Characteristics Poverty Regressions

Test

Statistics

df

p-value

LMerr
LMlag
RLMerr
RLMlag
SARMA

572.715
601.240
1.092
29.616
602.332

1
1
1
1
2

0.000
0.000
0.296
0.000
0.000

Table 4.8: Lagrange Multiplier Test for Access to Utilities Poverty Regressions

Test

Statistics

df

p-value

LMerr
LMlag
RLMerr
RLMlag
SARMA

79.975
80.211
0.157
0.393
80.368

1
1
1
1
2

0.000
0.000
0.692
0.531
0.000

Table 4.9: Lagrange Multiplier Test for Housing Conditions Poverty Regressions

Test

Statistics

df

p-value

LMerr
LMlag
RLMerr
RLMlag
SARMA

229.121
246.120
3.990
20.989
250.110

1
1
1
1
2

0.000
0.000
0.046
0.000
0.000

Table 4.10: Lagrange Multiplier Test for the Access to Education Poverty Regressions

Test

Statistics

df

p-value

LMerr
LMlag
RLMerr
RLMlag
SARMA

321.822
325.824
9.769
13.771
335.593

1
1
1
1
2

0.000
0.000
0.002
0.000
0.000
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Table 4.11: Lagrange Multiplier Test for Economic Capacity Poverty Regressions

Test

Statistics

df

p-value

LMerr
LMlag
RLMerr
RLMlag
SARMA

123.626
136.728
8.076
21.178
144.804

1
1
1
1
2

0.000
0.000
0.004
0.000
0.000

Table 4.12: Lagrange Multiplier Test for Total Poverty Regressions from MPI

Test

Statistics

df

p-value

LMerr
LMlag
RLMerr
RLMlag
SARMA

941.084
834.191
129.781
22.889
963.972

1
1
1
1
2

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Table 4.13 includes the regression results for the effect of forced migration on change
in total poverty by UBN. The coefficient found for Int.Expulsion is negative and not
significant and close to zero and the Int.Arrival is positive and significant. This coefficient means that municipalities that received more forced displaced population will
show a bigger decrease in poverty. The coefficient for arrival of displaced population is
significant and positive in the a-spatial model, fixed effects model, SEM, and SDEM.
The coefficient associated with the log of investments (Log(SGP )) is negative and significant. This result is consistent with larger cities having above 90% of population
non-poor on the UBN and with high investments to maintain access to amenities. The
results from the spatial error model show that the spatial coefficient λ is positive and
significant.

The regression results for housing characteristics show a positive coefficient associated with Int.Expulsion. Table 4.14 shows a positive and significant coefficient
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Table 4.13: Spatial Regression Results for Total Poverty Measured by UBN.

Int. Expulsion
Int. Arrival
Log(SGP)
Pct urban
Density

(OLS)

(OLS-FE)

(SEM)

(SDEM)

−0.007
(0.026)
0.150∗∗∗
(0.056)
−0.015∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.025
(0.015)
0.00000
(0.00001)

−0.034
(0.026)
0.195∗∗∗
(0.055)
−0.011∗∗
(0.005)
0.014
(0.017)
−0.00000
(0.00001)

−0.020
(0.026)
0.139∗∗
(0.054)
−0.013∗∗
(0.005)
0.014
(0.016)
0.00000
(0.00001)

0.298∗∗∗
(0.085)
0.375∗∗∗
(0.042)

−0.035
(0.027)
0.132∗∗
(0.055)
−0.014∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.015
(0.016)
0.00000
(0.00001)
0.030
(0.060)
0.089
(0.130)
0.005
(0.004)
0.005
(0.030)
0.00000
(0.00001)
0.225∗∗
(0.102)
0.375∗∗∗
( 0.042)

980

980

966.513
0.008
−1,917.026

969.381
0.008
−1,912.762

79.334∗∗∗
72.247∗∗∗

78.862∗∗∗
71.526∗∗∗

lag Int. Expulsion
lag Int. Arrival
lag Log(SGP)
lag Pct Urban
lag Density
Constant

0.332∗∗∗
(0.083)

λ
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Log Likelihood
σ2
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Residual Std. Error
Wald Test (df = 1)
LR Test (df = 1)
Note:

980
0.020
0.015

0.094 (df = 974)

980
0.139
0.108

0.089 (df = 945)

∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01
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associated with arrival of displaced population and the percentage of urban population. The coefficient related to investments is negative and significant in the spatial
models. This result agrees with the hypothesis that displaced population achieve living
conditions that are more achievable in urban areas, where better housing conditions
are a basic requirement for constructions. This improves housing characteristics but
does not decrease their poverty conditions. The spatial error coefficient is positive and
significant. One important detail to highlight is the Likelihood Ratio Test (LR Test)
and Wald Test that point to the SEM to be a better model than the SDEM, also because the spatial lags of the variables are not significant.

The results for the Access to Utilities component are in Table 4.15. These results
show also that the investments have a negative and significant coefficient, and the spatial lag of the investments have a positive and significant coefficient. The LR test and
Wald test also point to the SEM model to be a better fit. This latter result holds for
all the components of the UBN. The effects of the arrival variable are not statistically
significant in the spatial models. The reasoning behind the lack of relationship is the
costs faced to provide access to utilities for new residents.

The regression results for housing conditions show a negative coefficient for the
share of urban population and show a positive relationship for the intensity of expulsion (see Table 4.16). The coefficient for the intensity of arrival is statistically insignificant. The percentage of urban population is negatively correlated because when forced
migrants moved to the urban areas, they have to share housing with other families
while they are getting settled and that process sometimes takes years. The Intensity of
Expulsion is positively correlated because after they leave, the number of population
living in poor housing conditions decreased more in the town of origin.

The regression results for the education component show that this component is
susceptible to the intensity of arrival and expulsion (see Table 4.17), because the pop-
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Table 4.14: Regression Results for Housing Characteristics Poverty Measured by UBN.

Int.Expulsion
Int. Arrival
Log(SGP)
Pct. Urban
Density

(OLS)

(OLS-FE)

(SEM)

(SDEM)

0.079∗∗
(0.033)
0.107
(0.073)
0.004
(0.007)
0.136∗∗∗
(0.020)
−0.00001
(0.00001)

0.010
(0.031)
0.138∗∗
(0.067)
−0.004
(0.007)
0.086∗∗∗
(0.020)
−0.00001
(0.00001)

0.011
(0.027)
0.104∗
(0.055)
−0.009∗
(0.005)
0.080∗∗∗
(0.017)
0.00000
(0.00001)

0.105
(0.088)
0.725∗∗∗
(0.026)

−0.001
(0.029)
0.139∗∗
(0.061)
−0.009∗
(0.005)
0.092∗∗∗
(0.018)
−0.00000
(0.00001)
0.031
(0.074)
0.253
(0.161)
0.001
(0.004)
0.064
(0.041)
−0.00001
(0.00002)
0.053
(0.112)
0.713∗∗∗
(0.026)

980

980

903.735
0.008
−1,791.469

909.692
0.008
−1,793.383

736.732∗∗∗
450.335∗∗∗

677.787∗∗∗
430.342∗∗∗

lag Int.Expulsion
lag Int. Arrival
lag Log(SGP)
lag Pct. Urban
lag Density
Constant

−0.130
(0.108)

λ
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Log Likelihood
σ2
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Residual Std. Error
Wald Test (df = 1)
LR Test (df = 1)
Note:

980
0.085
0.081

0.121 (df = 974)

980
0.293
0.268

0.108 (df = 945)

∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01
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Table 4.15: Regression Results for Access to Utilities Poverty Measured by UBN.

Int.Expulsion
Int. Arrival
Log(SGP)
Pct. Urban
Density

(OLS)

(OLS-FE)

(SEM)

(SDEM)

−0.037
(0.033)
0.121∗
(0.072)
−0.010
(0.007)
−0.038∗
(0.020)
−0.00000
(0.00001)

−0.064∗
(0.034)
0.171∗∗
(0.071)
−0.014∗∗
(0.007)
−0.043∗∗
(0.022)
0.00000
(0.00001)

−0.037
(0.033)
0.100
(0.070)
−0.017∗∗
(0.007)
−0.021
(0.021)
0.00000
(0.00001)

0.364∗∗∗
(0.043)
0.349∗∗∗
(0.109)

−0.052
(0.035)
0.100
(0.071)
−0.019∗∗∗
(0.007)
−0.013
(0.021)
0.00001
(0.00001)
−0.039
(0.077)
0.193
(0.167)
0.008∗
(0.005)
−0.062
(0.038)
−0.00001
(0.00002)
0.361∗∗∗
(0.043)
0.263∗∗
(0.131)

980

980

717.798
0.013
−1,419.597

721.046
0.013
−1,416.093

73.109∗∗∗
67.216∗∗∗

71.689∗∗∗
66.720∗∗∗

lag Int.Expulsion
lag Int. Arrival
lag Log(SGP)
lag Pct Urban
lag Density
λ
Constant
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Log Likelihood
σ2
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Residual Std. Error
Wald Test (df = 1)
LR Test (df = 1)
Note:

0.243∗∗
(0.107)
980
0.015
0.010

0.121 (df = 974)

980
0.117
0.085

0.116 (df = 945)

∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01
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Table 4.16: Regression Results for Housing Conditions Poverty Measured by UBN.

Int.Expulsion
Int. Arrival
Log(SGP)
Pct Urban
Density

(OLS)

(OLS-FE)

(SEM)

(SDEM)

0.041∗∗
(0.020)
−0.021
(0.044)
−0.0003
(0.004)
−0.055∗∗∗
(0.012)
0.00001
(0.00001)

0.056∗∗∗
(0.019)
−0.008
(0.040)
−0.003
(0.004)
−0.021∗
(0.012)
0.00000
(0.00001)

0.036∗
(0.019)
−0.036
(0.040)
0.001
(0.004)
−0.035∗∗∗
(0.012)
0.00000
(0.00001)

0.043
(0.064)
0.521∗∗∗
(0.037)

0.029
(0.020)
−0.044
(0.042)
0.0005
(0.004)
−0.036∗∗∗
(0.012)
0.00000
(0.00001)
0.032
(0.048)
0.054
(0.103)
0.005∗
(0.003)
−0.076∗∗∗
(0.024)
0.00001
(0.00001)
0.006
(0.078)
0.510∗∗∗
(0.037)

980

980

1,246.796
0.004
−2,477.591

1,253.395
0.004
−2,480.790

202.203∗∗∗
174.375∗∗∗

188.540∗∗∗
166.780∗∗∗

lag Int.Expulsion
lag Int. Arrival
lag Log(SGP)
lag Pct Urban
lag Density
Constant

0.078
(0.066)

λ
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Log Likelihood
σ2
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Residual Std. Error
Wald Test (df = 1)
LR Test (df = 1)
Note:

980
0.035
0.030

0.074 (df = 974)

980
0.272
0.245

0.066 (df = 945)

∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01
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ulation that was forced out usually are located in rural areas where access to school
is inadequate. They gain access to public schools in their new place of residence and
the kids’ attendance to school is a requirement to receive the economic benefits from
a program of conditional cash transfers “Familias en Accion”. The results also show
a negative significant relationship for the percentage of urban population. It is negatively correlated because the larger cities have already achieved low levels of poverty
in this component. The spatial error coefficient is positive and significant, due to
the missing information related to the presence of armed groups and other conflict related components as well as the institutional strength of governments in municipalities.

The regression results for the Economic Capacity component are on Table 4.18.
They highlight the effect of the poverty change associated with the displacement variable for arrival. This result is explained by the move of a farmer from agricultural
production, where part of the income was paid in food and crops used for self consumption, to a different condition where income is received in money. Additionally,
the economic conditions in these municipalities are rustic and families are larger, this
issue affects the poverty measure with respect to the economic capacity of families in
rural areas. When families migrate, the parents usually move with the younger children, because the older kids choose not to migrate with the family or to move to other
locations. There is a negative relationship with total investment by the municipalities.
This could be explained by the low level of improvement in larger cities that invest
more to maintain their current infrastructure.

The application of the analysis to the changes in poverty measured by Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) show that forced displacement does not reduce poverty in
Colombian municipalities. Furthermore the negative coefficient associated with expulsion reflects that displacement affects the measure of poverty negatively, it increase
poverty since positive values of our dependent variable mean poverty decreases. The
positive coefficient associated with the arrival of displaced population is not significant.
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Table 4.17: Regression Results for the Access to Education Poverty Measured by UBN.

Int.Expulsion
Int. Arrival
Log(SGP)
Pct.Urban
Density

(OLS)

(OLS-FE)

(SEM)

(SDEM)

0.055∗∗∗
(0.014)
0.052∗
(0.030)
0.0002
(0.003)
−0.076∗∗∗
(0.008)
−0.00001∗
(0.00000)

0.015
(0.013)
0.077∗∗∗
(0.028)
−0.001
(0.003)
−0.088∗∗∗
(0.008)
−0.00001∗
(0.00000)

0.034∗∗∗
(0.013)
0.046∗
(0.026)
−0.003
(0.003)
−0.066∗∗∗
(0.008)
−0.00000
(0.00000)

0.160∗∗∗
(0.041)
0.606∗∗∗
(0.033)

0.026∗
(0.013)
0.052∗
(0.028)
−0.004
(0.003)
−0.068∗∗∗
(0.008)
−0.00000
(0.00000)
−0.003
(0.032)
0.104
(0.070)
0.004∗∗
(0.002)
−0.049∗∗∗
(0.017)
0.000
(0.00001)
0.112∗∗
(0.051)
0.604∗∗∗
(0.033)

980

980

1,669.638
0.002
−3,323.275

1,677.460
0.002
−3,328.920

337.240∗∗∗
251.047∗∗∗

334.554∗∗∗
242.774∗∗∗

lag Int.Expulsion
lag Int. Arrival
lag Log(SGP)
lag Pct. Urban
lag Density
Constant

0.100∗∗
(0.044)

λ
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Log Likelihood
σ2
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Residual Std. Error
Wald Test (df = 1)
LR Test (df = 1)
Note:

980
0.176
0.172

0.050 (df = 974)

980
0.361
0.338

0.045 (df = 945)

∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01
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Table 4.18: Regression Results for the Economic Capacity Poverty Measured by UBN.

Int.Expulsion
Int. Arrival
Log(SGP)
Pct.Urban
Density

(OLS)

(OLS-FE)

(SEM)

(SDEM)

0.001
(0.015)
0.095∗∗∗
(0.033)
−0.012∗∗∗
(0.003)
−0.001
(0.009)
0.00001∗
(0.00000)

0.001
(0.015)
0.096∗∗∗
(0.031)
−0.006∗
(0.003)
0.026∗∗∗
(0.009)
0.00000
(0.00000)

0.002
(0.015)
0.082∗∗∗
(0.031)
−0.008∗∗
(0.003)
0.013
(0.009)
0.00000
(0.00000)

0.135∗∗∗
(0.049)
0.452∗∗∗
(0.039)

−0.001
(0.015)
0.082∗∗∗
(0.032)
−0.008∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.013
(0.009)
0.00000
(0.00000)
−0.017
(0.035)
0.079
(0.076)
0.001
(0.002)
−0.068∗∗∗
(0.018)
0.00002∗
(0.00001)
0.150∗∗
(0.059)
0.427∗∗∗
(0.040)

980

980

1,508.213
0.003
−3,000.427

1,515.785
0.003
−3,005.570

131.778∗∗∗
108.055∗∗∗

112.248∗∗∗
94.197∗∗∗

lag Int.Expulsion
lag Int. Arrival
lag Log(SGP)
lag Pct. Urban
lag Density
Constant

0.215∗∗∗
(0.049)

λ
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Log Likelihood
σ2
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Residual Std. Error
Wald Test (df = 1)
LR Test (df = 1)
Note:

980
0.033
0.028

0.055 (df = 974)

980
0.218
0.189

0.050 (df = 945)

∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01
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Another important result is the positive relationship between the change in MPI and
investments, the percentage of urban population, and density of population, because
the poverty is easier to decrease in urban areas and by doing higher investments.

A comparison of the analysis between the UBN and MPI show that the change
in poverty measured by the UBN are affected by the forced migration and the MPI
results are not affected by the displacement in the same way. This migration shows
that the the UBN is affected by changes on urbanization and access to basic urban
amenities, while the MPI result does not depend solely on urban amenities to reduce
poverty. Because MPI of all the components included in the poverty dimensions in
their definition of poverty, and each dimension is based on multiple variables, instead
of one variable that can be biased.

4.6

Policy implications and conclusions

Forced displacement in Colombia has transformed the demographic composition of
the Colombian municipalities. This transformation created a tradeoff for migrants who
left all or most of their belongings, but moved to urban areas where they would gain access to the basic urban amenities, such as public utilities, education, and public health
services. However, this forced migration also affected the result of the measurement
of poverty in Colombian municipalities. The displaced population that was qualified
as poor was forced to leave and when this population arrived at the new municipality
could be considered as non-poor because of urban benefits gained in the new location.

The issue is that poverty measurements can be affected by demographic transformations. This issue arrises due to the simplicity of the poverty measure used. We
compared the results between the Unmet Basic Needs and the recently developed Multidimensional Poverty Index to identify possible issues in both and to verify whether
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Table 4.19: Regression Results for the Total Poverty Measured by MPI.

Int.Expulsion
Int. Arrival
Log(SGP)
Pct Urban
Density

(OLS)

(OLS-FE)

(SEM)

(SDEM)

−0.170∗∗∗
(0.032)
0.065
(0.069)
−0.030∗∗∗
(0.006)
0.280∗∗∗
(0.019)
0.0001∗∗∗
(0.00001)

−0.101∗∗∗
(0.024)
0.072
(0.050)
0.001
(0.005)
0.317∗∗∗
(0.015)
0.00004∗∗∗
(0.00001)

−0.072∗∗∗
(0.020)
0.045
(0.041)
0.021∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.257∗∗∗
(0.013)
0.00001
(0.00001)

−0.232∗∗∗
(0.066)
0.845∗∗∗
(0.019)

−0.075∗∗∗
(0.023)
0.032
(0.048)
0.024∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.264∗∗∗
(0.014)
0.00001
(0.00001)
−0.085
(0.060)
−0.132
(0.130)
0.006∗∗
(0.003)
0.037
(0.035)
0.00002
(0.00002)
−0.382∗∗∗
(0.085)
0.830∗∗∗
(0.019)

980

980

1,150.441
0.005
−2,284.881

1,162.034
0.004
−2,298.067

1,993.416∗∗∗
855.066∗∗∗

1,866.042∗∗∗
816.951∗∗∗

lag. Int.Expulsion
lag. Int. Arrival
lag Log(SGP)
lag Pct Urban
lag. Density
Constant

0.638∗∗∗
(0.103)

λ
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Log Likelihood
σ2
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Residual Std. Error
Wald Test (df = 1)
LR Test (df = 1)
Note:

980
0.312
0.308

0.116 (df = 974)

980
0.672
0.660

0.081 (df = 945)

∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01

Juan Tomás Sayago-Gómez
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both are affected by the displacement of population in Colombia.

The Shift-Share analysis applied to poverty measurements helps assess the composition of improvements and the changes in poverty in Colombian regions. Several
conclusions can be drawn by the insights from the composition of improvement in
growth rates. First, regions improve some components more than others, but across
the country, regions with higher growth are the most populated areas and the areas
that have higher growth rates in income. Second, the poorest areas reduced poverty
but the growth rates were significantly lower. Third, the oil regions have increased their
development but it should be further investigated as to whether the entire department
improved or only the oil producing municipalities. Poverty decreased in Colombia (see
Table 4.3) but the components improved differently by region. The trend differentials
show that a small group of municipalities became poles in development, while others
have improved more slowly.

The millennium goal of reducing poverty by half has probably been accomplished,
but the equity of this development is not a reality. Part of the result obtained from
the bias in the UBN methodology caused by the demographic transformation caused
by forced displacement. The change created by forced displacement that caused ruralurban migration of about 10% of the population also affected the measurement of
poverty. This flow of 10% of the population that moved to live in poorer conditions are
being considered as non-poor. It led to a mistaken evaluation of the change experienced.

Juan Tomás Sayago-Gómez
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(e) House characteristics

Figure 4.5: Shift in trend growth rate of non-poor population in the Municipalities

96

Chapter 5

Conclusions
5.1

Conclusions

This dissertation explored different elements related to immigration and its consequences on socioeconomic outcomes. The use of econometric techniques to approach
these hypotheses provides policymakers with answers regarding the possible outcomes
from immigration and further movements. These results are an important extension
of the consequences from migration onto crime, and how the migration affects poverty
measurements. Finally the dissertation also extends the current literature on the determinants for location choices of undocumented immigrants in the United States.

Chapter 2 analyzes whether the European Union enlargements in 2004 and 2007
caused increases in crime rates of two very popular European countries for immigrants.
Following the approach taken by studies applied to the United States and United
Kingdom, I extended the approach considering the issues from estimating instrumental
variable data panel models with fixed effects and comparing the outcome with the random effects counterpart. The results from the analysis indicate that the increased in
migration from all countries does not affect the total crime rate, violent crime rate, or
property crime rate. This result holds for the same types of crime and for immigrants
from specific origins such as African, and Latin American. However I find a positive
and significant correlation between the share of European immigrants and the property
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crime rates in these regions.

In Chapter 3, I explore the location choice of undocumented immigrants. I estimate
a spatial panel model that considers the dynamics of the location of undocumented immigrants by state in the United States. The effect of the economic variables are in
the expected directions. However, the spatial model accounts for the spreading effect
of undocumented immigrants that also locate in neighboring states in subsequent migrations, as migrants keep moving until they find a place where they can be located.
The sanctuary cities provide an environment for immigrants to locate and feel safe.
However the existence of the sanctuary city by itself is not the main attraction for
the immigrant. Instead, the size of the population in the sanctuary can measure more
accurately the attractiveness of the state.

Chapter 4 addresses the effect of forced migration on poverty. Forced migration
in Colombia provides a case where migrants have to flee to save their lives. They
leave their belongings behind for safety, not because they decided that they were going
to look for a better economic condition. This exogeneity provides an interesting case
because it transforms the demographic structure of the Colombian population. The
analysis reveals that all official measures of poverty by Unsatisfied Basic Needs were
affected by the displacement. Additionally I find that the different components in the
UBN measure showed decrease in poverty, because the destination has controlled the
component and the origin decreases the population that suffers the problem. Testing
the issue with a newly develop measure of poverty, I find that the new measurement
shows that the change in poverty is not correlated to the forced displacement and confirming the deficiencies of the official measures.
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Future research

The future research on migration issues should consider the actual changes in the
countries analyzed for this dissertation. First the Brexit and changes from United
Kingdom leaving the European Union will create a new diaspora of migrants returning
to Europe and finding a way to relocate. This movement will create changes in the
labor market. These changes will create another increase of immigrants in the European Union countries that will not be prepared to handle these movement of population.

The current migratory policies by the government of Donald Trump is going to
create new research ideas because undocumented immigrants are now being subject to
a stronger enforcement of controls by the police and other security institutions. Their
behavior will probably change and they will probably attempt to remain hidden and
not to take part of their usual activities. Additionally the uncertainty of foreign immigrants on the future prospects of a long term migration to United States will push out
top researchers and immigrants to other countries where they can feel reassured that
they can stay for long term.
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